DFC

5264 bookmarks
Custom sorting
An Econometric Investigation on the Stability of Stablecoins (DNB)
An Econometric Investigation on the Stability of Stablecoins (DNB)
De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) published a working paper that argues that major USD‑denominated stablecoins exhibit heterogeneous and time‑varying volatility, challenging the assumption of uniform stability. Using a multi‑model framework focused on returns, they find USDC and TUSD are highly sensitive to monetary, macro‑uncertainty, market‑volatility, and crypto shocks, while USDT and DAI show muted, short‑lived responses and primarily absorb volatility. Time‑varying connectedness analysis indicates stablecoins are usually volatility sinks but become more tightly integrated with global risk factors during stress episodes with short‑horizon spillovers dominating in crises and long‑horizon co‑movement rising since 2021. The authors argue that stablecoins should not be treated as a single risk category and that differentiated, reserve‑sensitive prudential and liquidity standards are warranted as they become embedded in macro‑financial transmission. [DNB]
·dnb.nl·
An Econometric Investigation on the Stability of Stablecoins (DNB)
Are Stablecoins Fungible Money? (SUERF)
Are Stablecoins Fungible Money? (SUERF)
[November 2025] SUERF published a policy brief in which Charles-Enguerrand Coste and George Pantelopoulos argue that stablecoins can be fungible money only when anchored to central bank money and supported by interoperable, final settlement infrastructures. They define fungibility in retail payments as requiring settlement finality, interoperability across blockchains and traditional systems, and seamless convertibility into the “ultimate” means of payment, namely central bank money. Under these conditions, tokenized funds and off-chain collateralized stablecoins, and prima facie on-chain collateralized stablecoins with readily convertible collateral, can be treated as fungible means of payment comparable to bank deposits. [SUERF] See also: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp3111~db48fc6139.en.pdf
·suerf.org·
Are Stablecoins Fungible Money? (SUERF)
Reforming MiCA for Euro Stablecoins (Blockchain for Europe)
Reforming MiCA for Euro Stablecoins (Blockchain for Europe)
Blockchain for Europe published a report in which Ulrich Bindseil and Erwin Voloder propose reforms to the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) to bolster euro-denominated electronic money tokens (EMTs). Core recommendations include permitting remuneration limited to reserve income pass-through, eliminating the 30-60% minimum bank deposit requirement to enable diversified high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) akin to liquidity coverage ratio standards, enhancing proportionate reserve transparency via standardized reporting, mandating stress testing and concentration limits, granting calibrated central bank deposit access for safeguarding, and clarifying cross-border multi-issuance frameworks. These adjustments aim to mitigate MiCAR's regulatory overreach—placing Europe on the downward-sloping Laffer curve for stablecoin competitiveness—while preserving prudential safeguards, reducing bank interdependencies, and elevating the euro's global on-chain role amid U.S. dollar dominance. [Blockchain for Europe]
·blockchain4europe.eu·
Reforming MiCA for Euro Stablecoins (Blockchain for Europe)
Western Union to Launch Stablecoin Next Month (The Block)
Western Union to Launch Stablecoin Next Month (The Block)
Western Union will launch a Solana-based, U.S. dollar–backed stablecoin called USDPT next month, initially using it as an internal settlement rail with key agents in select countries as an alternative to SWIFT, enabling on-chain cross-border settlement even during traditional banking holidays. The firm is also rolling out a Digital Asset Network (DAN) that connects consumer crypto wallets to Western Union’s retail and agent network so users can cash out digital assets into local currency through familiar outlets, with the first partner going live this week. Later this year, Western Union plans a USD “Stable Card” in dozens of markets, allowing consumers—especially in inflation-prone countries—to hold dollar-denominated value in stablecoins and spend globally. [The Block]
·theblock.co·
Western Union to Launch Stablecoin Next Month (The Block)
Token Freezes Force CFOs to Rethink Stablecoin Risk (PYMNTS.com)
Token Freezes Force CFOs to Rethink Stablecoin Risk (PYMNTS.com)
PYMNTS.com published an article that argues that fiat-backed stablecoins are not neutral instruments: centralized issuers retain administrative control enabling them to freeze specific wallet addresses or permanently destroy (“burn”) tokens in response to regulatory directives, sanctions compliance, or security incidents. This introduces what the article terms “governance risk” — distinct from market risk — requiring corporate treasury teams to conduct provenance due diligence on incoming stablecoin transactions comparable to AML protocols. Jurisdictional variability compounds the risk, as issuer governance frameworks differ materially across stablecoins. Consistent with this caution, only 13% of mid-market firms surveyed currently report using stablecoins.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ (PYMNTS.com)
·pymnts.com·
Token Freezes Force CFOs to Rethink Stablecoin Risk (PYMNTS.com)
Canada’s Stablecoin Framework (Government of Canada)
Canada’s Stablecoin Framework (Government of Canada)
[March 31, 2026] The Government of Canada published a federal framework in which non‑bank issuers of fiat‑backed stablecoins must register with the Bank of Canada, maintain fully backed high‑quality liquid reserves, and offer at‑par redemption in the reference currency. The framework centralizes prudential oversight at the Bank of Canada while leaving trading, payments, and anti‑money‑laundering oversight to existing securities and payments regimes, aiming to enable innovation and competition in digital payments while tightening consumer protection and financial stability safeguards. It is explicitly designed to align with European Union and United States approaches and with Financial Stability Board recommendations, positioning Canadian‑issued coins for prospective cross‑border interoperability. Key open questions concern how detailed reserve, redemption, and governance standards will be calibrated in regulation over 2026–27 and how authorities will exercise expansive national‑security and public‑interest powers to deny or revoke market access. [Government of Canada]
·web.archive.org·
Canada’s Stablecoin Framework (Government of Canada)
Assessing Whether Stablecoin Velocity Translates into Economic Impact (VISA)
Assessing Whether Stablecoin Velocity Translates into Economic Impact (VISA)

VISA's Ezechiel Copic argues that raw stablecoin velocity is a misleading proxy for “economic relevance” because it mostly reflects wholesale‑style financial activity rather than retail spending, so it must be benchmarked against Fedwire‑like turnover rather than M1. It explains that traditional M1 velocity measures how often money is used for purchases of goods and services, whereas total stablecoin velocity—calculated as on‑chain transaction volume divided by circulating supply—captures predominantly trading, settlement, and funding flows. When filtered to transactions of 250 dollars or less as a rough stand‑in for retail payments, stablecoin “retail” velocity is far below U.S. M1 velocity, implying minimal use in everyday commerce. But when compared to a financial‑system benchmark based on Fedwire transaction value relative to reserve balances, stablecoin velocity is still much lower in scale, indicating that while stablecoins show growing importance in financial markets, they remain modest relative to established wholesale infrastructures. Overall, the piece concludes that interpreting stablecoin data requires distinguishing retail from financial‑system use and recognizing that current stablecoin impact is concentrated in the latter. [VISA]

·corporate.visa.com·
Assessing Whether Stablecoin Velocity Translates into Economic Impact (VISA)
Tether Launches tether.wallet Self-Custodial Digital Wallet (Tether)
Tether Launches tether.wallet Self-Custodial Digital Wallet (Tether)
Tether has launched tether.wallet, a self‑custodial digital wallet intended to extend its stablecoin‑based payment infrastructure directly to end users in over 160 countries. The product aggregates access to Tether’s digital dollars (USD₮, USA₮), gold (XAU₮), and Bitcoin across multiple networks, abstracts away gas‑token management, and enables transfers via simple human‑readable identifiers, reducing frictions that have limited previous wallet adoption. This move potentially deepens dollarization dynamics in high‑inflation and underbanked jurisdictions while bypassing bank‑intermediated channels. [Tether]
·tether.io·
Tether Launches tether.wallet Self-Custodial Digital Wallet (Tether)
Banks Can Process Stablecoins Like Cheques (LinkedIn)
Banks Can Process Stablecoins Like Cheques (LinkedIn)

Tony McLaughlin (Ubyx) and Mike Ringer (ReStabilize) argue that regulated financial institutions should be allowed to process stablecoins as collection agents under existing banking law, analogously to cheques. They propose that banks and fintechs receive customer stablecoins, present them for redemption, and credit fiat balances, without being reclassified as crypto-asset dealers. This functional approach would make hosted stablecoin wallets commercially viable within banks and enable reusable identity and compliance credentials for self-custody wallets, expanding the effective regulatory perimeter while preserving non-custodial usage. It could shift stablecoin activity from opaque channels into supervised institutions and position the United Kingdom’s financial infrastructure for future sterling stablecoins and tokenized deposits. The key unresolved question is how legislators and supervisors will define the legal boundary between simple collection activity and broader crypto intermediation. [LinkedIn]

·linkedin.com·
Banks Can Process Stablecoins Like Cheques (LinkedIn)
Making Stablecoins Stable (IMF)
Making Stablecoins Stable (IMF)
The IMF published a paper that develops a theoretical framework to analyze the tension between stablecoin stability and issuer incentives. The central finding is that unregulated stablecoin issuers hold excessive risky assets to maximize profits, thereby elevating run risk while failing to internalize the welfare consequences for households. A regulator acting in the broad public interest can improve upon this outcome by mandating high-quality liquid asset backing, ideally central bank reserves, but strict liquidity requirements alone reduce issuer profitability and suppress stablecoin supply below socially optimal levels. The authors argue that achieving both stability and adequate issuance requires two complementary policy instruments: a safe backing asset requirement and a supplementary revenue source for issuers, such as remuneration on reserves or regulated data monetization. The paper draws supporting parallels from China's e-money experience and situates its findings relative to emerging regulatory frameworks including the U.S. GENIUS Act and the EU's MiCA regulation. [IMF]
·imf.org·
Making Stablecoins Stable (IMF)
What Are Stablecoins Used for Today? Estimating the Distribution of Stablecoins (Kansas City Fed)
What Are Stablecoins Used for Today? Estimating the Distribution of Stablecoins (Kansas City Fed)
The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Kansas City Fed) published an article in which Franklin Noll estimates that stablecoins are used predominantly for crypto‑finance trading, with payments accounting for less than 1 percent of supply. He finds roughly half of outstanding stablecoins sit in exchanges, decentralized finance, and related infrastructure, with another large share used for high‑value transfers and a material portion idle in rarely used wallets. This usage pattern implies that stablecoins currently function more as market plumbing and speculative liquidity than as a broad retail or commercial payments instrument, and that reliance on bridges and exchanges highlights interoperability and concentration risks in the ecosystem. [Kansas City Fed]
·kansascityfed.org·
What Are Stablecoins Used for Today? Estimating the Distribution of Stablecoins (Kansas City Fed)
Money and Payments Infrastructure: Understanding the Plumbing (Central Bank of Ireland)
Money and Payments Infrastructure: Understanding the Plumbing (Central Bank of Ireland)
The Central Bank of Ireland published an article in which Rhys Bidder argues that debates on stablecoins and blockchain-based money require a common analytical framework linking them to existing two-tier monetary structures and settlement systems. The article first defines money, settlement assets, and the distinction between public and private money, then maps how European payment “plumbing” centers on TARGET, related real-time gross settlement services, and collateral frameworks. It shows how commercial bank deposits, card networks, and correspondent banking ultimately settle in central bank reserves, while stablecoins function as bearer instruments whose secondary-market transfers bypass real-time gross settlement in central bank money. This matters for how regulators think about singleness of money, settlement finality, liquidity backstops, and access of non‑banks to core infrastructure, and for how tokenized deposits or central bank distributed ledger technology might modernize the two-tier model. The key open question is how far to integrate or constrain blockchain-based payment rails within this architecture. [Central Bank of Ireland]
·centralbank.ie·
Money and Payments Infrastructure: Understanding the Plumbing (Central Bank of Ireland)
Stablecoin Issuance Market: Four Business Models Reshaping the Market (Tiger Research)
Stablecoin Issuance Market: Four Business Models Reshaping the Market (Tiger Research)
Tiger Research published a report arguing that late‑entry stablecoin issuers can survive only by abandoning the dominant reserve‑interest model and specializing in distinct market niches. The authors show that Tether uses scale to monetize reserves while gradually repairing transparency and building a diversified real‑world asset (RWA) and investment portfolio, turning regulatory normalization into a way to defend its monetary base. StraitsX instead treats stablecoins as payments infrastructure, monetizing fee‑based transaction velocity under a Monetary Authority of Singapore license that converts compliance into a regional moat. M0 repositions issuance as shared infrastructure, using network effects across issuers and builders to become a neutral standard rather than a competing coin. KRWQ treats regulatory gaps and offshore non‑deliverable forward demand as an entry point, using offshore liquidity as an option on future domestic legitimacy, leaving open whether such sequencing can withstand eventual onshore regulatory choices. [Tiger Research]
·reports.tiger-research.com·
Stablecoin Issuance Market: Four Business Models Reshaping the Market (Tiger Research)
Self-Custodial Wallets in a Regulated World (Walletconnect and Ubyx)
Self-Custodial Wallets in a Regulated World (Walletconnect and Ubyx)
WalletConnect and Ubyx published a paper arguing that self-custodial wallets can operate within existing anti–money laundering, sanctions, and tax frameworks if regulators adopt technology-neutral, outcomes-based rules and focus obligations on intermediaries at the “edge.” The authors document concrete mechanisms—such as FATF "travel rule" data capture within wallet flows, cryptographic “sign-In with X” ownership proofs, programmable token-level controls, and blockchain analytics—that allow virtual asset service providers to meet customer due diligence, travel rule, and reporting obligations without banning or custodianizing self-custody. This matters because exclusionary rules would push activity offshore, create a two-tier system, and undermine both financial inclusion and supervisory visibility, whereas regulated interoperability preserves open finance benefits while strengthening compliance. The paper highlights unresolved questions around the precise regulatory status of new wallet architectures (trusted execution environments, multi-party computation, bank-deployed wallets) and the scope and consistency of edge-enforcement obligations across jurisdictions. [Walletconnect and Ubyx]
·share.hsforms.com·
Self-Custodial Wallets in a Regulated World (Walletconnect and Ubyx)
Payment Stablecoins and Cross Border Payments: Benefits and Implications for Monetary Policy Implementation (FRB)
Payment Stablecoins and Cross Border Payments: Benefits and Implications for Monetary Policy Implementation (FRB)
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) staff outline how regulated “payment stablecoins” for cross‑border use could lower reliance on correspondent banking while altering demand for reserves, deposits, and Treasury bills. They argue that low‑cost, widely accessible stablecoins could shorten payment chains, compress fees and delays, and introduce competitive pressure on concentrated correspondent banking networks, but would still leave some reliance on large banks for foreign exchange risk‑management and on/off‑ramp services. For policy and institutional design, they stress that stablecoin reserve‑asset composition—bank deposits, Treasury bills, or central bank reserves—would shift liquidity, safe‑asset demand, and central bank balance‑sheet management in materially different ways. [FRB]
·federalreserve.gov·
Payment Stablecoins and Cross Border Payments: Benefits and Implications for Monetary Policy Implementation (FRB)
An Efficient Frontier Analysis of Stablecoin Reserve Management (VISA)
An Efficient Frontier Analysis of Stablecoin Reserve Management (VISA)
VISA published an article in which Ezechiel Copic uses an efficient frontier framework to show how new U.S. and EU stablecoin rules compress reserve returns and reorient issuer economics toward liquidity and resilience. The article models pre‑regulation reserve strategies using Tether’s historical mix to illustrate a wide opportunity set, then re‑estimates frontiers under the U.S. GENIUS Act and the EU’s Markets in Crypto‑Assets Regulation. Under GENIUS, a narrow set of high‑quality liquid assets leaves only a thin band of feasible risk‑return combinations, making reserve management resemble liquidity engineering rather than portfolio optimization. Under MiCA, lower euro‑area rates and binding bank‑deposit floors further depress and compress the frontier, especially for “significant” issuers. The analysis implies competition will shift from balance‑sheet yield to technology, distribution, and compliance, while leaving open how far reduced issuer economics may constrain market entry and long‑run innovation. [VISA]
·corporate.visa.com·
An Efficient Frontier Analysis of Stablecoin Reserve Management (VISA)
Fiat-Backed Stablecoins and Narrow Banking (Atlanta Fed)
Fiat-Backed Stablecoins and Narrow Banking (Atlanta Fed)
The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s published a paper that argues that fiat‑backed stablecoins effectively implement a modern variant of narrow, full‑reserve banking under the 2025 GENIUS Act. The note explains that Chicago‑plan narrow banks and fiat‑backed stablecoin issuers both fund only cash and Treasury bills, provide payments and safekeeping but not lending, and target 1:1 redeemability. It stresses that stablecoins embed extra operational and intermediation layers—wallets, exchanges, blockchain settlement, and dependence on fractional‑reserve banks as custodians—creating additional run, peg‑deviation, and settlement risks relative to narrow banks. For policy and regulatory design, the analysis frames GENIUS‑style stablecoin regimes as functionally similar to narrow banks but with weaker direct supervision, no deposit insurance, and higher contagion channels from the legacy banking system, leaving open how to price, regulate, and backstop these new liabilities over time. [Atlanta Fed]
·media.licdn.com·
Fiat-Backed Stablecoins and Narrow Banking (Atlanta Fed)
Information Structures in Stablecoin Markets (arXiv)
Information Structures in Stablecoin Markets (arXiv)
Columbia University's Brian Z. Zhu develops a global-game model in which stablecoin run risk depends jointly on reserve fundamentals, the behavior of a large seller, and the precision of public versus private information about reserves. The model decomposes total run probability into “collateral risk” (runs driven by weak assets) and “large sale risk” (runs triggered by sizable redemptions), and shows that a large holder unambiguously raises selling pressure and shifts risk weight toward large-sale-driven runs as its size grows. Higher-precision public information reduces runs when fundamentals are strong but can amplify runs when fundamentals are weak, while more precise private signals have the opposite comparative statics, implying that heterogeneous, noisy private beliefs can stabilize fundamentally sound but informationally opaque stablecoins. The paper maps these results to recent events and regulations, arguing that transparency mandates like the U.S. GENIUS Act strengthen the link between runs and fundamentals but may lower capital efficiency and reduce the stabilizing role of belief heterogeneity. [arXiv]
·arxiv.org·
Information Structures in Stablecoin Markets (arXiv)
Are Stablecoins and Bank Deposits Substitutes? (SSRN)
Are Stablecoins and Bank Deposits Substitutes? (SSRN)
Rashad Ahmed (Anderson Institute for Finance and Economics) and Iñaki Aldasoro (BIS) posted a paper that analyzes U.S. weekly data from 2019–2025 to test whether deposit rates and reserve‑backed stablecoin holdings are substitutes. They find that higher demand deposit rates significantly slow stablecoin market capitalization growth, exploiting a nonlinear deposit‑rate pass‑through “kink” above a 3% federal funds rate, yielding effects about three times larger. This suggests bank funding conditions and monetary policy transmission now extend into stablecoin markets, with stronger substitution for USDC than USDT, aligning with USDC’s tighter links to U.S. users, and no comparable effect for bitcoin. The findings suggest that deposit‑rate regulation, the design of stablecoin regimes, and the stance of monetary policy can reallocate liquidity between banks and USD stablecoins, although identification relies on a single high‑rate episode and aggregate data that leave user‑level motives and heterogeneity across institutions unresolved. [SSRN]
·papers.ssrn.com·
Are Stablecoins and Bank Deposits Substitutes? (SSRN)
Western Union has Big Plans for Stablecoins (American Banker)
Western Union has Big Plans for Stablecoins (American Banker)
Western Union is making a strategic pivot toward stablecoins as part of the 175-year-old company’s efforts to transform into a digital-first organization. The company’s own stablecoin — the U.S. Dollar Payment Token (USDPT), issued on the Solana blockchain and managed by U.S. Bank — will convert “negative float” (capital costs from pre-funding partners) into interest-bearing revenue. Beyond revenue generation, USDPT gives Western Union programmable compliance controls across its operations in 200 countries and territories, allowing transaction terms to be customized at the partner level. The stablecoin is also expected to help customers in inflation-prone economies hold dollar-denominated assets. [American Banker]
·finance.yahoo.com·
Western Union has Big Plans for Stablecoins (American Banker)
Tether Appoints KPMG to Complete First Full Audit (Tether)
Tether Appoints KPMG to Complete First Full Audit (Tether)
Tether has appointed KPMG, one of the Big Four accounting firms, to perform a proper audit of its USDT stablecoin. Additionally, according to the Financial Times, Tether has also enlisted PwC, another of the Big four, to help prepare its internal systems for this auditing process. This initiative coincides with Tether's plans to register USDT under the U.S. GENIUS Act, signaling a significant step in its expansion efforts within the U.S. market. [Tether]
·tether.io·
Tether Appoints KPMG to Complete First Full Audit (Tether)
Stablecoins and the Future of Payments: Evidence from Financial Markets (IMF)
Stablecoins and the Future of Payments: Evidence from Financial Markets (IMF)
The IMF published a working paper that argues that recent U.S. stablecoin legislation is interpreted by markets as a major pro‑competitive shock to the payments industry. Using high‑frequency stock‑price data around key votes on the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act, they estimate that passage reduced incumbent U.S. payment firms’ aggregate market capitalization by about 18% (roughly $300 billion) once anticipation is accounted for, with larger losses for cross‑border specialists and smaller or no losses for firms protected by strong network effects or already offering crypto services. The authors infer that investors expect regulated, fully backed “payment stablecoins” to materially intensify competition—especially in cross‑border payments—while leaving open how far network incumbency and early crypto engagement will mitigate disruption over time. [IMF]
·imf.org·
Stablecoins and the Future of Payments: Evidence from Financial Markets (IMF)
Crypto-linked Card Activity Rebounds, Expands Globally (Visa)
Crypto-linked Card Activity Rebounds, Expands Globally (Visa)
Visa reports that crypto-linked card use on its network has rebounded since the 2022 “crypto winter,” with payment volumes recovering toward prior highs and becoming more geographically diverse, now led by Asia Pacific rather than being concentrated in Europe and North America. These cards let consumers spend cryptocurrencies or stablecoins anywhere Visa is accepted, with instant conversion to local fiat at the point of sale so merchants receive standard Visa payments and need not change their acceptance or settlement arrangements. Volumes surged roughly elevenfold between January 2021 and April 2022 alongside a sharp rise in Bitcoin’s price and a fivefold increase in stablecoin supply, then flattened after the Terra Luna collapse before resuming steady growth from 2024 in line with expanding stablecoin issuance. [Visa]
·corporate.visa.com·
Crypto-linked Card Activity Rebounds, Expands Globally (Visa)
How Canada Can Shape the Future of Stablecoins and Digital Payments (CD Howe Institute)
How Canada Can Shape the Future of Stablecoins and Digital Payments (CD Howe Institute)
The CD Howe Institute published an article in which Peter MacKenzie and Mark Zelmer argue that Canada must rapidly operationalize its Stablecoin Act and consider a central bank digital currency (CBDC) to avoid ceding payment-system sovereignty to U.S. dollar-linked stablecoins enabled by the GENIUS Act. They note that GENIUS-backed U.S. stablecoins and foreign exchanges could become core Canadian payment rails, undermining monetary sovereignty, domestic oversight, and data access, while Canada’s high-level Stablecoin Act leaves key issues on reserves, operations, and foreign platforms unresolved. The authors propose a function-based, two-track regime that treats pure payment stablecoins as fully backed payment instruments under Bank of Canada oversight and keeps tokenized deposits in the banking framework, complemented by Bank of Canada liquidity lines and a CBDC settlement layer to preserve singleness of money and cross-platform interoperability. They stress that the open question is whether Canada will implement detailed, “comparable” rules fast enough to shape international arrangements rather than import foreign standards. [CD Howe Institute]
·cdhowe.org·
How Canada Can Shape the Future of Stablecoins and Digital Payments (CD Howe Institute)
Which is the Fairest of all Tokenized Monies? (OMFIF)
Which is the Fairest of all Tokenized Monies? (OMFIF)
OMFIF published an article in which Ousmène Mandeng pitches tokenized money market fund (MMF) shares as an alternative tokenized settlement asset. They offer bankruptcy‑remote, interest‑bearing claims on sovereign or high‑quality assets rather than bank balance sheets. By enabling instant delivery‑versus‑delivery transfer and collateralization without title transfer, tokenized MMFs could shift institutional liquidity management from episodic subscription/redemption to continuous circulation, potentially easing run dynamics and unlocking high‑quality collateral for intraday liquidity and cross‑border settlement. Constant net asset value MMFs invested in government securities could function as par settlement instruments with favorable prudential treatment, positioning them as strong competitors to tokenized deposits and stablecoins in wholesale use cases. Key uncertainties concern the robustness of distributed ledger technology, the status of the on‑chain versus off‑chain legal register and the prudential and regulatory classification of these instruments, which will determine their scalability and systemic role. [OMFIF]
·omfif.org·
Which is the Fairest of all Tokenized Monies? (OMFIF)
Stablecoins Are Coming for FX Markets (Delphi Digital)
Stablecoins Are Coming for FX Markets (Delphi Digital)
Delphi Digital argues that dollar stablecoins are rapidly gaining share in FX, especially in long‑tail emerging market corridors where legacy correspondent banking makes cross‑border payments slow and expensive, with most costs driven by infrastructure rather than FX risk. In corridors like Argentina or Nigeria, fees and spreads are largely compensation for pre‑funded nostro/vostro accounts, delayed settlement, credit risk, and multiple intermediaries, so stablecoin rails that offer atomic, near‑instant settlement in tokenized dollars can undercut banks and keep corridors viable. The piece highlights that new infrastructures show how on‑chain FX could settle in seconds instead of days. However, it stresses that fiat on/off‑ramps remain the main bottleneck, since bank wires still run on legacy batch rails and regulatory frictions, implying that stablecoins will not displace major FX pairs soon but are already rebuilding broken payment rails in under‑served corridors. [Delphi Digital]
·x.com·
Stablecoins Are Coming for FX Markets (Delphi Digital)
The Curious Case of the Stablecoin Sandwich (LinkedIn)
The Curious Case of the Stablecoin Sandwich (LinkedIn)
G+D's Lars Hupel posted an article on LinkedIn that argues that the “stablecoin sandwich” model for cross‑border payments—converting local currency to a (mostly USD) stablecoin, sending it on‑chain, then converting back—largely replicates traditional correspondent banking rather than solving its hardest problems, because liquidity is concentrated in a few USD‑denominated stablecoins and most currencies lack deep stablecoin markets, so efficiency gains are modest and partly driven by regulatory arbitrage rather than technology; meanwhile, central banks are pursuing more promising alternatives like interlinking instant payment systems, broadening access to real-time gross settlement systems (RTGSs) to non‑banks, and building multilateral central bank digital currency (CBDC) platforms such as mBridge and Project Agorá, which more directly tackle fragmentation and access in cross‑border payments. [LinkedIn]
·linkedin.com·
The Curious Case of the Stablecoin Sandwich (LinkedIn)
Stablecoin = Fracturedcoin (FT)
Stablecoin = Fracturedcoin (FT)
This FT article critiques stablecoins’ ability to function as “single” money because issuance across multiple permissionless blockchains makes nominally identical tokens non‑fungible, fragments liquidity, and forces risky, costly bridging for interoperability. It argues that validator compensation via congestion rents and gas‑fee auctions means users internalise scaling costs, so network effects that underpin efficient payment instruments are weakened and stablecoins resemble a set of siloed instruments rather than a unified monetary asset. The piece suggests this undercuts claims that distributed consensus can substitute for a central bank’s common ledger, and raises a policy question: as stablecoin issuers obtain direct access to central bank payment rails, should regulators treat these liabilities as peripheral crypto instruments or integrate them into a consolidated, tightly supervised monetary framework?
·ft.com·
Stablecoin = Fracturedcoin (FT)
Tokenomics and Blockchain Fragmentation (BIS)
Tokenomics and Blockchain Fragmentation (BIS)
The BIS published a Hyun Song Shin paper that develops a global-games model of distributed technology technology (DLT) network validator coordination to show that higher decentralization requires disproportionately higher validator rents funded by user fees. This implies that capacity must be endogenously constrained and congestion is structurally necessary rather than incidental. This tokenomic structure induces entry of lower-security, lower-fee chains that attract users priced out of incumbent ledgers, generating persistent fragmentation across base layers and layer‑2s and eroding the network effects that normally drive convergence on a single medium of exchange. As a result, for example, nominally identical stablecoins on different chains are non‑fungible, bridged rather than natively interoperable, so liquidity and acceptance remain chain‑specific despite common issuers and regulatory regimes. The paper argues that a central‑bank‑anchored trust and settlement layer is required to deliver monetary integration, rather than relying on fully decentralized consensus. [BIS]
·bis.org·
Tokenomics and Blockchain Fragmentation (BIS)
Stablecoins and the Missing Infrastructure Layer (LinkedIn)
Stablecoins and the Missing Infrastructure Layer (LinkedIn)
Tord Coucheron posted a paper that argues that stablecoin growth reflects a structural response to cross‑border payment frictions in correspondent banking, not a fundamental demand for new private money. It shows that liquidity fragmentation, prefunding costs, and opaque, sequential settlement make traditional cross‑border transfers slow and capital‑intensive, making privately issued tokenized settlement claims economically attractive despite reserve and governance risks. It then introduces a real‑time multi‑currency financial market infrastructure (FMI) in central bank money, where banks hold multiple currencies and settle via payment‑versus‑payment (PvP), driving settlement costs toward zero and preserving the deposit‑funded banking model, monetary policy transmission, and monetary sovereignty. [LinkedIn]
·linkedin.com·
Stablecoins and the Missing Infrastructure Layer (LinkedIn)