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New Recommendations for Public Payment Preparedness (Riksbank)
New Recommendations for Public Payment Preparedness (Riksbank)
Sveriges Riksbank issued new recommendations on “public payment preparedness,” urging households to see themselves as part of Sweden’s total defence and to maintain multiple means of payment so essential purchases can continue during disruptions, crises or war in an increasingly digitalized environment. It advises adults to hold at least SEK 1,000 in cash at home (in mixed denominations) for roughly a week’s essential spending and to use cash periodically so cash infrastructure remains robust, to have at least two payment cards linked to different card networks (e.g. Visa and Mastercard), to ensure access to a mobile payment service such as Swish that relies on different infrastructure than cards, and to keep physical payment cards and PINs accessible even if mobile wallets are normally used. The recommendations feed into the Riksbank’s broader work on national payment contingency and will also feature in the Payments Report 2026, due on March 12, 2026. [Riksbank]
·riksbank.se·
New Recommendations for Public Payment Preparedness (Riksbank)
Call for Payment Service Providers to Participate in Digital Euro Pilot (ECB)
Call for Payment Service Providers to Participate in Digital Euro Pilot (ECB)
The European Central Bank (ECB) has opened applications for euro area licensed payment service providers (PSPs) to join a twelve‑month digital euro pilot in the second half of 2027. It will use a non‑legal‑tender “beta” digital euro in a controlled environment to test technical, operational and user experience (UX) aspects of P2P (online/offline) and P2B payments at physical and online points of sale. PSPs will onboard users and merchants without remuneration, be selected based on eligibility plus weighted criteria (compliance status, technical capacity, market presence, geographic/segment coverage, delivery track record), and then work directly with national central banks and Eurosystem teams. The ECB has published technical and procedural documentation and PSPs must apply by May 14, 2026, with the whole exercise framed as preparatory and conditional on future EU legislation and a separate decision to issue a digital euro. [ECB]
·ecb.europa.eu·
Call for Payment Service Providers to Participate in Digital Euro Pilot (ECB)
Digital Pound Design Phase Progress Update (BOE)
Digital Pound Design Phase Progress Update (BOE)
The Bank of England (BOE) published a progress update on the digital pound design phase, which is focusing on four workstreams: a joint assessment of need, policy and public‑interest impacts, commercial viability, and operational feasibility; a detailed blueprint covering product design, roles of intermediaries, interoperability in a multi‑money ecosystem, product roadmap, alias services and offline functionality; targeted experiments and proofs of concept (including a prototype ledger architecture and the Digital Pound Lab, where firms test use cases such as POS payments, conditional B2B payments, tourist wallets and programmable features via allowances and locks); and extensive engagement with industry, academia and civil society to refine requirements, privacy protections and user safeguards. This work is tightly linked to the UK National Payments Vision and the new Retail Payments Infrastructure Board, with an emphasis on interoperability between bank deposits, tokenized deposits, stablecoins and a potential digital pound, and on preserving access to cash, prohibiting “programmable money”, and embedding strong privacy and data‑protection guarantees in both law and system architecture. The design phase runs to 2026, and the Bank and HM Treasury plan to publish the blueprint assessment and a decision on whether to proceed with building a digital pound later in 2026. [BOE]
·bankofengland.co.uk·
Digital Pound Design Phase Progress Update (BOE)
Stablecoins and Monetary Policy Transmission (ECB)
Stablecoins and Monetary Policy Transmission (ECB)
The European Central Bank (ECB) published a paper on rising stablecoin adoption's impact on monetary policy by reshaping banks’ funding structures and, in turn, the strength and composition of transmission channels. As stablecoins alter banks’ liability mix towards wholesale funding, the traditional bank lending channel is strengthened (through tighter funding constraints) but the deposit channel is weakened (by changing how deposit rates and quantities react to policy rates), thereby undermining the predictability of the overall pass‑through from policy rates to financial conditions. If foreign‑currency (especially USD‑pegged) stablecoins became widely used in the euro area, they would increase banks’ reliance on foreign‑currency wholesale funding and “import” foreign monetary and risk conditions into domestic liquidity and spending, eroding monetary sovereignty and making it harder for the central bank to stabilize inflation and output, particularly in stress episodes. [ECB]
·ecb.europa.eu·
Stablecoins and Monetary Policy Transmission (ECB)
The New Financial Ecosystem and the Role of Central Banks (BOJ)
The New Financial Ecosystem and the Role of Central Banks (BOJ)
Bank of Japan (BOJ) Governor Ueda Kazuo provided updates to the central bank's digital payments projects. The BOJ is still investigating retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) with an eye towards providing a “digital form of cash” if needed, and has set up (and now plans to reorganize) a CBDC Forum to draw on private‑sector expertise and consider the future of payments more broadly. Internationally, the BOJ is participating in Project Agorá, exploring tokenized deposits and smart‑contract‑based cross‑border interbank payments on blockchains, and domestically it has launched a sandbox to test settlement in central bank current account balances on blockchain‑based systems, including links to existing infrastructures and use cases such as interbank and securities settlement. [BOJ]
·boj.or.jp·
The New Financial Ecosystem and the Role of Central Banks (BOJ)
Bank of Korea Calls for Banks-Only Issuance of Won-Denominated Stablecoins (EToday)
Bank of Korea Calls for Banks-Only Issuance of Won-Denominated Stablecoins (EToday)
The Bank of Korea has reportedly submitted a report to South Korea’s National Assembly Strategy and Finance Committee that urged that only licensed commercial banks be allowed to issue won-denominated stablecoins at the outset, citing money‑laundering, financial stability, and FX‑regulation circumvention risks. The Bank of Korea suggests non‑bank issuers could be considered later once their risk‑absorbing capacity is assessed. South Korean lawmakers are currently debating the next phase of digital-asset legislation, which includes provisions on stablecoins. [EToday]
·etoday.co.kr·
Bank of Korea Calls for Banks-Only Issuance of Won-Denominated Stablecoins (EToday)
Stablecoin Disintermediation (FRBNY)
Stablecoin Disintermediation (FRBNY)
The New York Federal Reserve Bank (FRBNY) published a paper that develops a theory and provides empirical evidence that payment stablecoins disintermediate banks not only by drawing deposits away from traditional institutions but also by transmitting significant liquidity stress to the banks that service stablecoin issuers. Using matched data between on‑chain issuance/redemption activity of a large U.S. dollar stablecoin and Fedwire interbank payments, the authors identify “partner banks” that hold stablecoin deposits and process flows for the issuer. They show that after new partnerships form following the 2023 crypto‑bank failures, these banks experience large, persistent increases in interbank payment volume (about 67%) and in intraday reserve balance volatility tightly linked to daily primary market stablecoin activity, implying that stablecoin-related payments act as frequent liquidity shocks. To manage these shocks, partner banks operate “narrowly,” holding substantially higher reserve balances—roughly 1.5 billion dollars more on average and a much larger reserves‑to‑assets ratio—while their loan share of assets falls by about 14 percentage points relative to similar banks, indicating a crowding‑out of lending capacity. The authors argue that this liquidity channel of disintermediation broadens the ways stablecoins can weaken bank deposit franchises, concentrate reserves in a few institutions, complicate the central bank’s task of gauging system‑wide reserve demand, and potentially propagate or amplify run dynamics from stablecoins to banks during stress events. [FRBNY]
·newyorkfed.org·
Stablecoin Disintermediation (FRBNY)
ID Meets Instant: Enabling Trusted, Inclusive Fast Payments through Digital ID (World Bank)
ID Meets Instant: Enabling Trusted, Inclusive Fast Payments through Digital ID (World Bank)
The World Bank published a paper that presents a conceptual model for integrating digital identity into fast payment systems (FPSs) and introducing new ways to make and receive payments through verifiable credentials. The objective is to explore how interoperability between digital ID and payments can address enduring challenges related to fraud prevention, customer onboarding, authentication, and the seamless integration of identity into transaction flows. The paper highlights how identity-linked credentials can support broader inclusion and functionality. Credentials can be delivered through multiple access channels, including digital ID wallets, interoperable wallets, payment service provider (PSP) applications, QR codes, and single-use tokens, ensuring usability across different devices and connectivity conditions. The model also supports controlled delegation, enabling individuals, businesses, or automated agents to act on behalf of users under clearly defined and auditable rules. The paper situates this framework within international experience, noting that while some jurisdictions have begun linking digital ID and payments, most implementations remain narrowly focused on onboarding and know-your-customer processes. At the same time, the paper recognizes that integrating identity and payments at scale raises significant governance, legal, and operational challenges. Effective implementation requires robust frameworks for consumer protection, data privacy, liability, and institutional coordination, as well as careful attention to user experience and trust. [World Bank]
·openknowledge.worldbank.org·
ID Meets Instant: Enabling Trusted, Inclusive Fast Payments through Digital ID (World Bank)
A Model of Monetary Singleness (BOE)
A Model of Monetary Singleness (BOE)
The Bank of England (BOE) published an analytical framework for studying the singleness of money. It's based on a three-period banking model where banks choose both the unit of account of their debt and whether it can be used as a medium of exchange. The framework suggests that small deviations from singleness may still be consistent with the efficient allocation, consistent with the fact that small deviations from par already arise today (for example, ATM withdrawal fees). However, inefficient equilibria are more likely to occur if the newly introduced forms of digital money are issued by private entities with distinct business models from incumbent financial institutions. The model also highlights the stabilizing roles of both cash and central bank reserves in promoting the singleness of money. Reserves ensure issuers share a consistent asset base, while cash provides a backstop by enabling interoperability through central bank money. [BOE]
·bankofengland.co.uk·
A Model of Monetary Singleness (BOE)
Rwandan CBDC Project Moves to Pilot Phase (BNR)
Rwandan CBDC Project Moves to Pilot Phase (BNR)
The National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) published the results of its five‑month central bank digital currency (CBDC) proof of concept (PoC) with BNR staff that tested a retail e‑FRW across online, offline (dual‑offline smartcards), and USSD channels, confirming technical feasibility and the potential to enhance payment resilience, inclusion, and innovation. User research showed strong interest in using e-FRW if it is secure, easy to use, and widely accepted, with offline functionality viewed as essential for continuity in low‑connectivity areas. The PoC also explored wallet‑level programmability, ran a national ideathon to gauge ecosystem readiness, and simulated cross‑border atomic settlement, all within a two‑tier model that preserves the roles of financial institutions. Key lessons concern device diversity, onboarding, support processes, privacy and cybersecurity requirements, and the need for strong legal underpinnings, leading to a planned 12‑month pilot in Kigali, a secondary city, and rural sites to test real‑world use cases, integration, and cross‑border corridors under clearly defined key performance indicators (KPIs) and risk controls. Giesecke+Devrient (G+D) was the central bank's technology partner on the project. [BNR]
·bnr.rw·
Rwandan CBDC Project Moves to Pilot Phase (BNR)
ASEAN’s Digital Payment Revolution: A New Frontier for Regional Integration, Thailand (IMF)
ASEAN’s Digital Payment Revolution: A New Frontier for Regional Integration, Thailand (IMF)

The IMF published a paper that reviews how rapid digital payment adoption in ASEAN—especially Thailand’s PromptPay-led fast payments and QR linkages—is reshaping domestic and cross-border transactions by lowering costs, boosting financial inclusion, and supporting SMEs, while introducing new cyber, fraud, and AML risks. It documents a surge in domestic fast and QR payments, the build‑out of bilateral QR and fund-transfer linkages under ASEAN’s Regional Payment Connectivity and Local Currency Transaction frameworks, and emerging multilateral architectures such as BIS’s Project Nexus and wholesale CBDC platform mBridge to overcome the limits of fragmented bilateral models. Using Thai data for 2020–24, the empirical analysis finds that cross‑border QR usage rises when local‑currency–USD volatility is higher, suggesting local‑currency QR payments help users manage FX risk compared with card payments settled via the dollar, and that QR tends to substitute for traditional bank and card channels where financial access is weaker. The authors argue that scaling interoperable, local‑currency cross‑border QR schemes—alongside better data use for SME credit, stronger regional AML/CFT coordination, and harmonized data protection—can deepen ASEAN trade integration and strengthen financial resilience to external shocks. [IMF] ​

·imf.org·
ASEAN’s Digital Payment Revolution: A New Frontier for Regional Integration, Thailand (IMF)
UK FCA Selects 4 Firms to Test Stablecoin Innovation in its Regulatory Sandbox (UK FCA)
UK FCA Selects 4 Firms to Test Stablecoin Innovation in its Regulatory Sandbox (UK FCA)
The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has selected four firms—Monee Financial Technologies, ReStabilise, Revolut and VVTX—from 20 applicants to test stablecoin services in its Regulatory Sandbox, focusing mainly on issuance and use cases including payments, wholesale settlement and crypto trading, so that these products can be trialled in real-world conditions with safeguards while FCA specialists provide feedback and refine proposed rules to ensure stablecoins can be trusted for payments, settlement and trading, inform the UK’s final stablecoin regime due later in 2026, and align with the broader crypto regulatory roadmap and related initiatives such as the Digital Securities Sandbox and the new cryptoasset authorisation regime starting from 2026 with full implementation by October 2027. [UK FCA]
·fca.org.uk·
UK FCA Selects 4 Firms to Test Stablecoin Innovation in its Regulatory Sandbox (UK FCA)
BNP Paribas Uses Public Blockchain for Money Market Fund (Markets Media)
BNP Paribas Uses Public Blockchain for Money Market Fund (Markets Media)
BNP Paribas Asset Management has issued a tokenized share class of an existing French‑domiciled money market fund on the public Ethereum blockchain using its AssetFoundry platform, but with a permissioned model that restricts holdings and transfers to authorized participants to remain within regulatory requirements. This follows an earlier tokenized money market fund in Luxembourg on a private blockchain and is structured as a one‑off intra‑group pilot in which BNP Paribas Asset Management acts as issuer, Securities Services as transfer agent and wallet/key operator, and AssetFoundry as the tokenization and connectivity layer, allowing the group to test end‑to‑end issuance, transfer agency and public‑chain connectivity while maintaining governance, investor protection and operational robustness. [MarketsMedia]
·marketsmedia.com·
BNP Paribas Uses Public Blockchain for Money Market Fund (Markets Media)
U.S. SEC Loosens Broker-Dealer Stablecoin Rules (SEC)
U.S. SEC Loosens Broker-Dealer Stablecoin Rules (SEC)

The U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an FAQ relating to the treatment of payment stablecoins under the broker-dealer net capital rule (Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1). A "payment stablecoin" is a USD–denominated stablecoin meeting specific regulatory and reserve criteria that change once the GENIUS Act takes effect. The new treatment sharply reduces how much capital firms must reserve against payment stablecoins—from 100% of their market value to a 2% haircut, effectively treating them like money market instruments with a ready market. [SEC]

·sec.gov·
U.S. SEC Loosens Broker-Dealer Stablecoin Rules (SEC)
PwC 2026 Global Crypto Regulation Report (PWC)
PwC 2026 Global Crypto Regulation Report (PWC)
PwC published the 2026 edition of its Global Crypto Regulation Report 2026 that explores the rapidly evolving regulatory landscape for digital assets, with a particular focus this year on stablecoins – their issuance models, reserve and redemption requirements, and supervisory frameworks – alongside key policy shifts and emerging trends in over 50 jurisdictions. This latest edition examines how policymakers are refining approaches to mitigate risks while enabling responsible innovation across the digital asset ecosystem. [PwC]
·legal.pwc.de·
PwC 2026 Global Crypto Regulation Report (PWC)
The Case for Collateral Tokenization (ValueExchange)
The Case for Collateral Tokenization (ValueExchange)
The ValueExchange published a report that examines the case for collateral tokenization in capital markets, based on a Q3 2025 survey of 203 market participants across global regions. The findings reveal that firms currently manage an average of USD 74 billion in collateral, with 25% being either excess or non-remunerated overnight—costing approximately USD 2.82 billion per firm annually in lost treasury income. Key challenges include operational complexity across up to 65 locations, settlement delivery issues affecting 69% of respondents, and operational costs comprising up to 57% of transaction costs. The report shows strong optimism for tokenisation, with 94% of firms believing it will increase collateral mobility, 80% of North American firms expecting major impact, and 52% planning to go live by end-2026. Expected benefits include a 13.4% reduction in failed trades, over USD 340 million in immediate savings for tier-one firms, and significant improvements in settlement certainty through instant DVP capabilities. However, progress is hindered by regulatory constraints and legal clarity issues affecting over 50% of firms, though 69% expect these challenges to be resolved within 2-3 years. [ValueExchange]
·media.licdn.com·
The Case for Collateral Tokenization (ValueExchange)
Indian Government to Launch CBDC-Based Public Distribution System Pilot using (Government of India)
Indian Government to Launch CBDC-Based Public Distribution System Pilot using (Government of India)
India's Union Home Minister Amit Shah announced the February 16, 2026 launch of India's first central bank digital currency (CBDC)-based public distribution system pilot. It introduces subsidy transfers for foodgrains through the Reserve Bank of India's CBDC platform. Under the pilot phase, 26,333 families across the Sabarmati zone of Ahmedabad, Surat, Anand, and Valsad receive digital tokens in their wallets containing details of commodity, quantity, and price. Beneficiaries using smartphones authenticate transactions by scanning QR codes at fair price shops, while those with feature phones receive one-time passwords through an Aadhaar-based verification system. The programmable CBDC coupons can only be used to purchase specified foodgrains at authorized ration shops and cannot be converted to cash, creating a clear audit trail of grain movement and subsidy utilization. [Government of India]
·pib.gov.in·
Indian Government to Launch CBDC-Based Public Distribution System Pilot using (Government of India)
Bank of Russia to Conduct Study on the Creation of a Russian Stablecoin (TASS)
Bank of Russia to Conduct Study on the Creation of a Russian Stablecoin (TASS)
Russia's TASS news agency reported that the Bank of Russia plans to conduct a study in 2026 on the feasibility of creating a Russian stablecoin. First Deputy Chairman of the Bank of Russia Vladimir Chistyukhin said "we have plans to conduct a study this year where we will once again assess this situation. Indeed, our traditional position is that this is not allowed, but taking into account the practice of a number of foreign countries, we will once again look at what risks and prospects there are here and bring this up for public discussion". [TASS]
·tass.ru·
Bank of Russia to Conduct Study on the Creation of a Russian Stablecoin (TASS)
Madagascar Projet eAriary One Pager (BFM)
Madagascar Projet eAriary One Pager (BFM)
[October 19, 2020] Banky Foiben'i Madagasikara (BFM) published a one-pager on its e-Ariary central bank digital currency (CBDC) project. The project aims to affirm monetary sovereignty, ensure financial system stability, promote financial inclusion, control physical currency circulation, and establish a modern payment system in response to the global shift toward digital payments, cryptocurrencies, and new financial actors accelerated by COVID-19. The project follows a cautious two-phase approach: first conducting analysis, design, and experimentation, then proceeding to deployment only if the pilot phase proves successful, while carefully managing potential impacts on monetary and financial stability. [BFM]
·banky-foibe.mg·
Madagascar Projet eAriary One Pager (BFM)
European Parliament Votes for Online and Offline Digital Euro (Central Banking)
European Parliament Votes for Online and Offline Digital Euro (Central Banking)
On February 10, 2025 the European Union (EU) Parliament has endorsed the digital euro initiative, reaching agreement with the European Council on creating a currency that will function both online and offline. They rejected an earlier proposal by the parliamentary rapporteur that would have restricted the digital euro to an offline version only (420 votes in favor, 158 against and 64 abstentions). Members of Parliament approved an amendment that stated that the central bank digital currency (CBDC) was “essential to strengthen EU monetary sovereignty, reduce fragmentation in retail payments, and support the integrity and resilience of the single market [as] the increasing digitalization of payments, if left exclusively to private and non-EU actors, risks creating new forms of exclusion for both users and merchants" (438 in favor, 158 against and 44 abstentions). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0034_EN.html [Central Banking and European Parliament]
·centralbanking.com·
European Parliament Votes for Online and Offline Digital Euro (Central Banking)
Ethiopa unveils instant payment system plans (Finextra)
Ethiopa unveils instant payment system plans (Finextra)
Ethiopia National Instant Payment System (EthioPay-IPS) was officially unveiled at the Ethiopia Digital Payment Conference 2.0 in December 2025. When operational, the EthSwitch system, powered by BPC's SmartVista platform, will connect 32 banks, 12 microfinance institutions, and several payment service providers, enabling real-time account-to-account and wallet-to-wallet transfers, QR payments, and recurring payment services across the country. This infrastructure aims to accelerate financial inclusion and digital payment adoption in Ethiopia, where person-to-person transactions have already tripled year-on-year to reach 128 million operations in 2024/2025, while providing merchants and consumers with secure, immediate settlement capabilities for commerce, utilities, taxes, and government fees on a unified national platform. [Finextra]
·finextra.com·
Ethiopa unveils instant payment system plans (Finextra)
Programming Money Without Programmable Money (FRBNY)
Programming Money Without Programmable Money (FRBNY)
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York published a staff report that examines the distinction between "programmable money" and "programmable payments" in the context of central bank digital currency (CBDC) and tokenized money systems. The authors propose a two-layer framework consisting of an "asset layer" (a ledger recording ownership of plain-vanilla money) and a "program layer" (instructions for conditional transfers), which issues "certificates" that can be classified by two properties: transferability (whether ownership can be transferred) and convertibility (whether the certificate releases basic money when conditions are met). Pure programmable money is defined as transferable but non-convertible certificates that could circulate perpetually without releasing basic money, while pure programmable payments are non-transferable but convertible certificates (like direct debit arrangements). However, programmable money would likely not satisfy the "no questions asked" (NQA) property needed for good money and therefore wouldn't circulate widely as money. [FRBNY]
·newyorkfed.org·
Programming Money Without Programmable Money (FRBNY)
Bank Negara Launches Digital Ringgit Pilot Programs (BNM)
Bank Negara Launches Digital Ringgit Pilot Programs (BNM)
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) announced that its Digital Asset Innovation Hub (DAIH) has onboarded three initiatives in 2026 to test real-world applications of ringgit stablecoins and tokenized deposits, focusing on wholesale payment use cases for domestic and cross-border transactions, including tokenized asset settlement. These initiatives will be conducted in a controlled environment with ecosystem partners, including corporate clients and other regulators, with some exploring Shariah-related considerations. The testing aims to assess monetary and financial stability implications, with BNM planning to provide clearer policy direction on ringgit stablecoins and tokenized deposits by end-2026, potentially integrating with existing wholesale central bank digital currency (CBDC) work. [BNM]
·bnm.gov.my·
Bank Negara Launches Digital Ringgit Pilot Programs (BNM)
Central Bank Digital Currency and Gresham's Law: An Experimental Analysis (SNB)
Central Bank Digital Currency and Gresham's Law: An Experimental Analysis (SNB)
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) published a paper that examines how people use central bank digital currency (CBDC) versus risky bank deposits through a laboratory experiment. The researchers tested Gresham's law—the principle that "bad money drives out good"—by having participants allocate funds between a risk-free account (like CBDC) and a risky account (like bank deposits) that could lose 50% with 10% probability. Key findings show that when the risk-free account is unrestricted, people extensively hold and pay with it. However, when limited by a ceiling or negative interest rate, people tend to hoard the risk-free money as a store of value while using risky money for payments—confirming Gresham's law. The study concludes that mechanisms designed to limit CBDC holdings (necessary to protect the banking system) may undermine its effectiveness as a payment method, suggesting it may be better to build payment systems on existing bank deposits rather than CBDC. [Source: SNB]
·snb.ch·
Central Bank Digital Currency and Gresham's Law: An Experimental Analysis (SNB)
Stablecoins in Retail Payments
Stablecoins in Retail Payments
ArXiv published a paper that systematically compares stablecoin-based payments with traditional card networks as retail payment systems. The authors introduce the CLEAR framework (Cost, Legality, Experience, Architecture, and Reach) to evaluate both systems across five dimensions. Their analysis reveals that while stablecoins offer advantages like continuous settlement, lower rail-level fees, and programmability, they suffer from significant drawbacks including weaker consumer protection (no native chargebacks), higher user-facing complexity (gas fees, wallet management), fragmented interoperability across blockchains, and limited merchant acceptance. Card networks, by contrast, subsidize consumers through interchange fees, provide strong legal recourse mechanisms, and benefit from standardized global infrastructure and network effects. The paper concludes that stablecoins demonstrate conditional advantages in closed-loop environments, cross-border corridors, and high-friction payment contexts (particularly in high-inflation economies), but remain structurally disadvantaged as general-purpose retail payment instruments compared to card networks due to their institutional incompleteness and lack of coordinated governance frameworks.
·arxiv.org·
Stablecoins in Retail Payments
The Hidden Plumbing of Stablecoins: Financial and Technological Risks in the GENIUS Act Era (MIT DCI)
The Hidden Plumbing of Stablecoins: Financial and Technological Risks in the GENIUS Act Era (MIT DCI)
The MIT Digital Currency Initiative (MIT DCI) published a paper evaluates the financial, technological, and regulatory risks facing U.S. dollar stablecoins under the 2025 GENIUS Act. The authors argue that while the Act strengthens reserve asset quality and transparency, it treats stablecoin stability primarily as a balance-sheet problem, leaving critical vulnerabilities unaddressed. Maintaining par-value redemption depends not only on high-quality backing assets but also on the functioning of Treasury and repo markets, broker-dealer balance-sheet capacity, and blockchain operational reliability. The paper identifies three interconnected risk layers: financial risks (including Treasury market fragility and dealer intermediation bottlenecks), technological risks (smart contract bugs, consensus attacks, bridge failures), and regulatory gaps (undefined redemption mechanics, lack of capital requirements, no access to Federal Reserve liquidity facilities). The analysis reveals that even conservatively backed stablecoins could face stress from redemption surges or market disruptions, and that stablecoin issuers have significantly lower capital buffers than commercial banks. The authors conclude that durable stability requires an integrated approach spanning financial-market infrastructure, prudential regulation, and software governance, while highlighting a key policy dilemma: granting stablecoin issuers Fed access could reduce liquidity risk but might disintermediate banks and affect monetary policy transmission. [Source: MIT DCI]
·dci.mit.edu·
The Hidden Plumbing of Stablecoins: Financial and Technological Risks in the GENIUS Act Era (MIT DCI)
Money as a Coordination Device: Some Historical Lessons (BIS)
Money as a Coordination Device: Some Historical Lessons (BIS)
The BIS's Hyun Song Shin examines money's role as a coordination device by drawing parallels between historical systems (like the Bank of Amsterdam's bills of exchange) and modern decentralized cryptocurrencies. The core argument is that decentralized consensus mechanisms face a fundamental tradeoff: achieving true decentralization requires validators to earn sufficient rents to maintain infrastructure, but this necessitates congestion and high transaction fees, which undermines money's essential network effects. As a result, the cryptocurrency ecosystem has become increasingly fragmented across multiple Layer 1 and Layer 2 blockchains (Ethereum, Tron, Solana, etc.), with stablecoins now circulating across non-interoperable networks that require bridges or centralized exchanges. Shin concludes that this fragmentation contradicts money's coordination function, raising critical questions for central banks about how to maintain monetary system coherence while interacting with these fragmented stablecoin infrastructures. [Source: BIS]
·bis.org·
Money as a Coordination Device: Some Historical Lessons (BIS)
CBDC and Monetary Sovereignty (CEPR)
CBDC and Monetary Sovereignty (CEPR)
This Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) article argues that a central bank digital currency (CBDC) is not essential for maintaining monetary sovereignty, contrary to popular claims. The author contends that throughout history, monetary stability has relied on a hybrid system of publicly defined units of account backed by private money (like bank deposits), rather than universal access to public currency. True monetary sovereignty depends on the central bank's legal authority and its capacity to absorb risk through balance-sheet operations during crises, not on issuing retail digital currency. The article further distinguishes between money (the settlement asset) and payments (the transaction mechanism), arguing that concerns about foreign payment providers are payment system issues requiring regulatory solutions, not CBDC. [Source: CEPR]
·cepr.org·
CBDC and Monetary Sovereignty (CEPR)
The Guardian view on Europe’s payments problem: sovereignty starts at the till (Guardian)
The Guardian view on Europe’s payments problem: sovereignty starts at the till (Guardian)
The Guardian argues that Europe should develop its own payment infrastructure to reduce dependence on US-controlled systems like Visa and Mastercard, especially given Donald Trump's willingness to use economic leverage against allies. The editorial points to India's Unified Payments Interface (UPI) as a model—a state-backed, low-fee digital payment system that has successfully reduced reliance on foreign card networks while enabling billions of instant mobile transactions monthly. While acknowledging implementation challenges in the EU's complex institutional landscape, the piece contends that creating a European payment system is essential for genuine sovereignty and strategic autonomy, particularly as China and India are already exporting their own domestic payment models globally.
·theguardian.com·
The Guardian view on Europe’s payments problem: sovereignty starts at the till (Guardian)
Stablecoins Beyond The Hype: Lack Of Credit Protection For Holders (Forbes)
Stablecoins Beyond The Hype: Lack Of Credit Protection For Holders (Forbes)
Forbes published an article by Vipin Bharathan that examines critical flaws in the GENIUS Act's stablecoin regulations, particularly regarding credit protection for holders if an issuer becomes insolvent. While the Act claims stablecoin holders would be first in line during bankruptcy with a 14-day payout, legal analysis by Adam Levitin reveals they actually rank fifth as unsecured creditors, behind four types of secured creditors including repo lenders, DIP (Debtor in Possession) lenders, bankruptcy professionals, and set-off claims. The article warns that stablecoins lack FDIC insurance protections that saved bank depositors during crises like SVB's collapse, making them vulnerable during runs when redemptions could trigger a downward spiral in treasury reserve values. As stablecoin issuance grows, their potential failure could threaten financial infrastructure, possibly forcing government intervention despite their private nature—creating a scenario where profits remain private but losses become public, while contradictions in the poorly-drafted legislation will likely be resolved through lengthy bankruptcy litigation rather than the promised rapid payouts. [Source: Forbes]
·forbes.com·
Stablecoins Beyond The Hype: Lack Of Credit Protection For Holders (Forbes)