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Interconnect to Stabilize: Cross-Border Payments in a Fragmenting World (Banca D'Italia)

Banca d'Italia Governor Fabio Panetta argues that cross-border payments remain structurally deficient despite domestic progress, and that the G20 Roadmap's four targets—speed, cost, transparency, and access—remain unmet in the remittance segment, with average costs at 6.4% against a 3% objective. Bank of Italy researchers who posed as ordinary users and conducted actual stablecoin transfers found no systematic cost advantage once conversion fees into and out of crypto are included, with some corridors reaching 9%. Root causes include legal and time-zone complexity, fragmented messaging standards, a contracted correspondent banking network (down 30% since 2011), and opaque FX conversion costs. Panetta proposes national-level action plans along three lines: strengthening domestic infrastructure (ISO 20022, extended RTGS hours, central bank money as settlement anchor), improving regulatory frameworks (competition, transparency, FATF travel rule), and preserving global payment system openness. Whether geopolitical fragmentation via rival parallel systems, such as BRICS Pay, erodes interoperability is the key unresolved question. [Banca D'Italia]

#CrossBorder #Payments #Eurozone #Italy #Fintech #CryptoAssets #DFC

·bancaditalia.it·May 9, 2026

Interconnect to Stabilize: Cross-Border Payments in a Fragmenting World (Banca D'Italia)

The Future of Programmable Payments: Why CBDC and Stablecoins Need Each Other (LinkedIn)

The Future of Programmable Payments: Why CBDC and Stablecoins Need Each Other (LinkedIn) The Bank of Israel's Assaf David-Margalit posted a nice interpretation of the Bank of Canada's recently published "to tokenize or not to tokenize" working paper. Assaf argues that tokenized central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and regulated stablecoins should operate as complementary infrastructure layers rather than rivals. The Bank of Canada's paper's core insight is that a tokenized CBDC establishes a "technological floor" by offering superior collateral efficiency—eliminating default risk allows the central bank to support transaction volumes with lower collateral requirements, crowding out inefficient stablecoins through market discipline. Assaf distinguishes programmable payments infrastructure (capable of interacting with smart contracts) from programmable money (which would compromise fungibility), asserting that CBDC should provide the settlement layer while private stablecoins innovate at the application layer using CBDC as the reserve asset. [LinkedIn]

#CBDC #Fintech #Programmability #Stablecoins #SmartContracts #DFC #Payments

·linkedin.com·May 9, 2026

The Future of Programmable Payments: Why CBDC and Stablecoins Need Each Other (LinkedIn)

After Acacia: The Next Era of Financial System Innovation? (RBA)

[March 25, 2026] Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Assistant Governor Brad Jones foreshadowed the conclusions from the Project Acacia. Assisted with regulatory relief from ASIC and AUSTRAC, industry participants in Project Acacia explored 20 use cases involving a range of assets, forms of money and settlement arrangements. It found that tokenisation and related infrastructure changes can materially reduce settlement frictions, counterparty risk and manual processing in wholesale markets, especially in fixed income and term deposits, and support new asset structures and investor segments, However, large‑scale adoption is constrained by entrenched network effects, legal uncertainty (enforcement of on‑chain records, settlement finality, licensing perimeter, prudential treatment) and the absence of a coordinated public‑private strategy to scale from pilots to commercial deployment. [RBA]

#Australia #CBDC #wCBDC #Fintech #Tokenization #DFC

·web.archive.org·May 9, 2026

After Acacia: The Next Era of Financial System Innovation? (RBA)

To Tokenize, or Not to Tokenize: The Design Question for a CBDC (Bank of Canada)

The Bank of Canada published a paper that develops a general equilibrium model to assess whether a central bank digital currency (CBDC) should be tokenized—deployable on programmable ledgers to compete with stablecoins—or non-tokenized and confined to off-chain markets, where traditional and crypto banks coexist. Tokenization matters for equilibrium only when collateral use differs across sectors; the three governing structural parameters are crypto-bank pledgeability, crypto-asset scarcity, and the social valuation of on-chain transactions. For institutional design, tokenized CBDC crowds out stablecoins and improves welfare when crypto banks are unreliable and crypto collateral is scarce, whereas non-tokenized CBDC may dominate when on-chain activity is less socially desirable or bond-collateral reallocation to the crypto sector is itself welfare-improving; both forms reduce bank lending, posing a payment-efficiency-versus-intermediation trade-off. [Bank of Canada]

#CBDC #Canada #Fintech #DFC

·bankofcanada.ca·May 8, 2026

To Tokenize, or Not to Tokenize: The Design Question for a CBDC (Bank of Canada)

Smartphone Instead of Wallet: Mobile Payment is Booming (EHI)

The EHI Retail Institute's "Payment Systems in Retail 2026" reports that mobile payment reached 19.3% of non-cash transactions at German point-of-sale in 2025, up from 12.8% in 2024, representing 9.3% of approximately 20 billion annual transactions. Growth was partly enabled by Apple opening its near-field communication interface to third-party apps following European Commission intervention. Cash fell to 32.3% of turnover; card rose to 65.1%, led by Girocard (40.5%), with international debit cards gaining 2.5 percentage points to 9.4%. The unresolved question is whether continued contactless displacement of cash will prompt regulatory reassessment of legal-tender obligations. [EHI]

#Payments #Fintech #Germany #Cash #MobileMoney #Wallets #DFC

·ehi.org·May 6, 2026

Smartphone Instead of Wallet: Mobile Payment is Booming (EHI)

Legal Tender -A Barbarous Relic in the Digital Currency Era (SSRN)

In a paper posted on SSRN, Christian Pfister argues that granting legal tender status to retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) in advanced economies is a conceptually weak and potentially distortionary extension of a historically contingent, often obsolete institution. The paper critiques recent IMF legal analyses for presuming a “digital cash” equivalence and for conflating the unit of account, the issuer, and specific payment instruments when defining legal tender. Pfister shows that modern payment efficiency, financial inclusion, and safety can be achieved through regulation and public infrastructure without legal tender, and that combining legal tender status with regulated aggressive pricing of public rails could crowd out deposits, weaken bank intermediation, and recreate public “walled gardens.” This raises a core design question: whether any residual role for legal tender should attach to the unit of account, central bank liabilities, or particular instruments, and how to do so without impairing monetary transmission, competition, or innovation. [SSRN]

#CBDC #Fintech #LegalTender #DFC

·papers.ssrn.com·May 5, 2026

Legal Tender -A Barbarous Relic in the Digital Currency Era (SSRN)

The Impact of Stablecoins on the International Monetary and Financial System (BIS)

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published a paper that argues that dollar‑denominated stablecoins primarily reinforce existing currency hierarchies while creating new channels for digital dollarization in emerging markets and developing economies. They document rapid, dollar‑centric growth, with stablecoins already acting as private store‑of‑value and payment instruments that circumvent weak domestic banking systems and capital controls. This threatens monetary sovereignty and complicates capital‑flow management, while simultaneously deepening demand for short‑term United States public debt via reserve portfolios. The authors frame policy choices around three paths: niche crypto‑only use, destabilizing “digital dollarization,” and tightly regulated domestic integration. [BIS]

#Stablecoins #EMDEs #BIS #Fintech #CryptoAssets #Financial Stability #DFC

·bis.org·May 5, 2026

The Impact of Stablecoins on the International Monetary and Financial System (BIS)

Progressing Fund Tokenisation (UK FCA)

The UK Financial Conduct Authority (UK FCA)sets out final rules and guidance to accelerate tokenisation of authorised funds and introduce an optional “direct to fund” dealing model using issues-and-cancellations accounts instead of manager box dealing. The statement clarifies that on-chain ledgers can be primary books and records, public distributed ledgers and smart contracts are permitted subject to outcome‑based controls, and tokenised units may sit across multiple blockchains within a class. It tightens ring‑fencing around umbrella cash by constraining omnibus issue-and-cancellation accounts under protected cell legislation, while dropping a proposed mandatory client‑money fallback and instead imposing enhanced reconciliation and unattributed‑cash rules. The package signals openness to stablecoins and tokenised gilts for settlement and operations under an interim waiver‑based regime, while deferring full alignment with the new crypto-asset framework and future composable “tokenised portfolio management” models. [UK FCA]

#Regulation #Fintech #Tokenization #UnitedKingdom

·fca.org.uk·May 5, 2026

Progressing Fund Tokenisation (UK FCA)

The BCEAO Invites Submissions for Research on Financial Inclusion (BCEAO)

The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) is inviting submissions for the 2026 Abdoulaye FADIGA Prize, which rewards high‑quality economic research on West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) economies. It explicitly invites research on financial inclusion and digital innovation, including work on how cryptocurrencies, mobile money, central bank digital currencies, and fintech can expand access to financial services in WAEMU, while rigorously assessing associated risks, regulatory and supervisory implications, and their interaction with payment systems, financial stability, and monetary policy transmission in the Union. [BCEAO]

#WAEMU #Fintech #CBDC #MobileMoney #CryptoAssets #Stablecoins #DFC

·bceao.int·May 5, 2026

The BCEAO Invites Submissions for Research on Financial Inclusion (BCEAO)

The Impact of Stablecoins: Considerations for BaaS Banks (Crowe LLP)

Crowe LLP consultants argue that stablecoins pose a structural challenge to banking-as-a-service (BaaS) banks that extends beyond payments into deposit composition, treasury workflows, and customer relationships. With wallet-based infrastructure stablecoins consolidate functions previously distributed across multiple intermediaries. For BaaS banks, the disintermediation risk is less about individual payment flows than about becoming peripheral to the liquidity and settlement environments where fintech partnerships operate. The piece offers a tiered decision framework — monitor, prepare, or act — calibrated to fee-income exposure and partner behavior. However, whether stablecoin adoption remains confined to discrete use cases or becomes foundational infrastructure remains an unresolved question. [Crowe LLP]

#Fintech #Stablecoins #Regulation #FinancialStability #UnitedStates #DFC

·crowe.com·May 3, 2026

The Impact of Stablecoins: Considerations for BaaS Banks (Crowe LLP)

Banks in the Age of Stablecoins: Lessons from Their Historical Responses to Financial Innovations (FRB)

Federal Reserve Board (FRB) economists argue, in a May 2026 FEDS Note, that banks historically respond to disintermediation threats through regulatory advocacy, product innovation, and strategic partnership rather than passive retreat, and apply that framework to stablecoins. Drawing on the money market fund (MMF) episode of the 1970s–80s and the PayPal/Venmo experience, the authors show that banks eventually recaptured market share despite initial disadvantage. However, stablecoins present a compounded challenge, combining MMFs' regulatory-arbitrage dynamic with payment platforms' technological differentiation, while introducing faster potential run dynamics via 24/7 blockchain settlement. Whether aggregate deposit levels contract materially depends on how stablecoin issuers structure their reserves. [FRB]

#Fintech #Stablecoins #UnitedStates #Regulation #FinancialStability #DFC

·federalreserve.gov·May 3, 2026

Banks in the Age of Stablecoins: Lessons from Their Historical Responses to Financial Innovations (FRB)

Central Bank Digital Currency and Monetary Architecture (Dirk Niepelt)

In a literature review that has been accepted for publication by the Journal of Economic Literature, Dirk Niepelt argues that the macroeconomic consequences of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) depend primarily on the policy choices accompanying its introduction. Organizing the survey around a neutrality result, the paper demonstrates that bank disintermediation does not independently constitute a source of non-neutrality, provided the central bank recycles CBDC proceeds to banks on deposit-equivalent terms. Most existing research conflates policy-contingent with fundamental sources of non-neutrality, obscuring the extent of policymaker control. Because CBDC represents a structural shift in monetary architecture rather than a technical payment upgrade, it raises political economy questions that exceed the conventional mandate of central banks. [Niepelt.ch]

#CBDC #Fintech #DFC #FinancialStability

·niepelt.ch·May 2, 2026

Central Bank Digital Currency and Monetary Architecture (Dirk Niepelt)

On the Resilience of Payment Methods (NBER)

The U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) published a paper that argues, using multi-source U.S. and cross-country evidence, that cash functions as critical fallback liquidity when electricity outages disable digital payment infrastructure during natural disasters. Event studies across store-level transaction data, card aggregates, and household scanner records show that hurricanes generate persistent outages, shifting spending composition sharply toward cash, while pre-disaster expenditure spikes are credit-financed stockpiling. The finding that payment-system fragility is a first-order attribute of any instrument has direct implications for regulators overseeing cashless transitions, mandatory acceptance rules, and the design of offline-capable central bank digital currencies. [NBER]

#NBER #Payments #Cash #Fintech #Offline #DFC #Resilience

·nber.org·May 2, 2026

On the Resilience of Payment Methods (NBER)

Meta Rolls Out Stablecoin Payments (Coindesk)

Meta has rolled out digital currency payouts for select creators in Colombia and the Philippines. The payouts use the USDC stablecoin on either the Solana or Polygon blockchain networks, processed via Stripe’s Link wallet and accompanied by tax reporting from both Meta and Stripe. The initiative marks Meta's return to stablecoins after it attempted to introduce the Libra token, later renamed Diem, only to shut down the project amid regulatory scrutiny in 2022. [Coindesk] https://www.facebook.com/business/help/1141348158001625/

#Solana #Polygon #Stripe #Fintech #Facebook #Meta #Payments #Diem #Libra #Stablecoins #DFC

·coindesk.com·May 2, 2026

Meta Rolls Out Stablecoin Payments (Coindesk)

BOE Considers Keeping Digital Pound On Ice (Bloomberg)

The Bank of England (BOE) and HM Treasury (HMT) are reportedly considering slowing down the digital pound project to defer making an immediate firm decision to approve or scrap it. Officials have been encouraged by private-sector innovation—especially tokenized deposits—that could deliver many CBDC benefits (faster, cheaper payments) within the existing regulated banking system, reducing the urgency to build a central-bank solution. The project has faced skepticism from the public, Parliament, and even BOE Governor Andrew Bailey, who remains unconvinced of the need for a retail CBDC. A decision to build would entail upfront costs in the hundreds of millions of pounds (later offset by CBDC income), voluntary participation by banks, and risk of political backlash over privacy concerns. [Bloomberg]

#CBDC #Fintech #UnitedKingdom #DFC

·bloomberg.com·May 1, 2026

BOE Considers Keeping Digital Pound On Ice (Bloomberg)

For a Political Economy of Central Bank Digital Currency (REP)

In this 2024 Revue d’Economie Politique (REP) article, Christian Pfister applies a positive (political economy) rather than normative framework to retail central bank digital currency (rCBDC). He maps stakeholder incentives across governments, central banks, regulators, incumbent banks, and fintech firms, then tests whether stated policy rationales align with those incentives. He concludes that publicly foregrounded motives, like financial inclusion, payment system safety, monetary sovereignty, and privacy, are analytically weak or already reached in developed economies. The dominant but largely unstated drivers are fiscal, such as seigniorage maximization through balance-sheet expansion, permanent rollover of sovereign debt held as rCBDC backing, and reduced tax evasion. Setting rCBDC remuneration at zero, officially framed as “do no harm” to bank intermediation, simultaneously serves those seigniorage objectives while suppressing a monetary policy transmission channel that the academic literature broadly endorses. For institutional design, combining legal tender status with fee exemptions advantages rCBDC in ways that raise competitive-neutrality concerns and risk crowding out private innovation. In non-democratic settings, programmable money creates structural conditions for mass surveillance. [REP]

#Fintech #CBDC

·shs.cairn.info·Apr 30, 2026

For a Political Economy of Central Bank Digital Currency (REP)

Qivalis Stablecoin Consortium Set to Add At Least 19 European Banks (Blockstories)

Blockstories reports that at least 19 additional European banks have committed to join the Qivalis euro-stablecoin consortium, potentially bringing total membership to over 30. The expansion spans 12 countries and includes both large institutions (e.g., Groupe BPCE, ABN AMRO, Nordea) and smaller banks, with further entrants pending approval. The consortium aims to build shared, MiCA-compliant infrastructure for a euro-denominated stablecoin targeted for H2 2026, rather than fragmented bank-specific tokens. The approach reflects resource constraints and strategic caution among banks toward crypto-native issuers, but leaves open questions on governance, adoption, and competitive positioning versus standalone or non-bank stablecoin models. [Blockstories]

#Stablecoins #Fintech #Europe #Eurozone #DFC

·blockstories.io·Apr 30, 2026

Qivalis Stablecoin Consortium Set to Add At Least 19 European Banks (Blockstories)

Why Java Card Is a Natural Foundation for Secure Digital Cash (G+D)

Lars Hupel (G+D) argues that Java Card, as the execution environment for secure elements, is a strong foundation for digital cash (including CBDCs) because it supports offline-capable, tamper-resistant wallets, integrates standardized cryptography and PKI for secure issuance and transfer, enforces wallet lifecycle policies and integrity, and keeps sensitive operations inside certified hardware to balance privacy with control, while its modular, standards-based design can adapt to future cryptographic and regulatory changes. [G+D]

#Fintech #CBDC #Payments #Offline #JavaCard #G+D

·javacardforum.com·Apr 30, 2026

Why Java Card Is a Natural Foundation for Secure Digital Cash (G+D)

Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Suspends DCash 2.0 Project (ECCB)

[February 13, 2026] The Monetary Council of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) approved the suspension of the DCash 2.0 central bank digital currency (CBDC) project to prioritize the development of the fast payment system (FPS) and participation in the The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Payments and Settlement System (CAPSS) pilot. [ECCB]

#ECCB #Caribbean #Fintech #CBDC #DFC #FastPayments

·eccb-centralbank.org·Apr 30, 2026

Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Suspends DCash 2.0 Project (ECCB)

The Stablecoin Stumbling Block (FT)

The Financial Times (FT) published an article in which Daniel Heller argues that existing stablecoin designs are structurally unfit to serve as wholesale settlement assets at scale. He notes that post-crisis standards for financial market infrastructures require settlement in central bank money or assets with equivalent credit quality and intraday liquidity, a bar current stablecoin reserve and redemption models fail to meet. This matters because large-value payments and securities settlement depend on systemically robust “money,” and today’s stablecoins embed maturity, liquidity, and operational risks misaligned with that role. Heller sees potential in tokenized central bank money or purpose-built, narrow-balance-sheet wholesale stablecoins, but leaves open whether central banks will grant reserve access and how global oversight would be structured. [FT]

#Stablecoins #Fintech #CryptoAssets #Regulation #Settlement #DFC

·ft.com·Apr 30, 2026

The Stablecoin Stumbling Block (FT)

Implementing the Digital Euro Project (PIIE)

On April 22, 2026, the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) hosted a virtual event at which Nicolas Véron interviewed the European Central Bank's (ECB's) Piero Cipollone on the digital euro project. As Izabella Kaminska noted on X, at one point Veron opined that the ECB's concerns about the big US payment companies (e.g., MasterCard and VISA) pulling out of Europe is somewhat far-fetched, to which Cipollone admitted that the rhetoric is largely in play just to motivate legislators to push ahead with the digital euro. "The geopolitical risk, this is resonating much more with politicians and that's where we saw some acceleration from the political side to put this project into focus... I must confess that before, this was a slow-moving project, at least at the legislative level. Then what happened in the last three/four years, it provided a sort of acceleration, mostly on the political side". [PIIE] https://x.com/izakaminska/status/2046942778437829085

#ECB #CBDC #Fintech #DFC #Eurozone

·piie.com·Apr 29, 2026

Implementing the Digital Euro Project (PIIE)

An Econometric Investigation on the Stability of Stablecoins (DNB)

De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) published a working paper that argues that major USD‑denominated stablecoins exhibit heterogeneous and time‑varying volatility, challenging the assumption of uniform stability. Using a multi‑model framework focused on returns, they find USDC and TUSD are highly sensitive to monetary, macro‑uncertainty, market‑volatility, and crypto shocks, while USDT and DAI show muted, short‑lived responses and primarily absorb volatility. Time‑varying connectedness analysis indicates stablecoins are usually volatility sinks but become more tightly integrated with global risk factors during stress episodes with short‑horizon spillovers dominating in crises and long‑horizon co‑movement rising since 2021. The authors argue that stablecoins should not be treated as a single risk category and that differentiated, reserve‑sensitive prudential and liquidity standards are warranted as they become embedded in macro‑financial transmission. [DNB]

#Stablecoins #Fintech #CryptoAssets #DFC

·dnb.nl·Apr 28, 2026

An Econometric Investigation on the Stability of Stablecoins (DNB)

Instant Payments as a New Normal : Case Study of Liquidity Impacts for the Finnish Market (BOF)

The Bank of Finland (BOF) published an article in which Matti Hellqvist and Kasperi Korpinen argue that full migration of Finnish retail payments from cycle-based settlement in STEP2 to instant payments would modestly raise system-wide central bank liquidity needs while materially reshaping bank-level profiles. Using artificially generated transaction-level data calibrated to April 2020 STEP2 statistics, they estimate that instant payments increase aggregate daily liquidity needs by an average of 2.7% (about 8.6 million euros), with a 95th percentile increase below 8.7% (about 28 million euros), relative to a baseline liquidity need of roughly 324 million euros. They show that most additional liquidity can be predicted ex ante from basic flow statistics, that marginal liquidity savings from adding more settlement cycles quickly diminish, and that network topology is largely irrelevant for liquidity in the full-migration steady state. Open questions concern asymmetric and partial-transition scenarios, where topology and stress dynamics may matter more. [BOF]

#Liquidity #Payments #PaymentSystems #Fintech #FastPayments #Finland

·publications.bof.fi·Apr 28, 2026

Instant Payments as a New Normal : Case Study of Liquidity Impacts for the Finnish Market (BOF)

Are Stablecoins Fungible Money? (SUERF)

[November 2025] SUERF published a policy brief in which Charles-Enguerrand Coste and George Pantelopoulos argue that stablecoins can be fungible money only when anchored to central bank money and supported by interoperable, final settlement infrastructures. They define fungibility in retail payments as requiring settlement finality, interoperability across blockchains and traditional systems, and seamless convertibility into the “ultimate” means of payment, namely central bank money. Under these conditions, tokenized funds and off-chain collateralized stablecoins, and prima facie on-chain collateralized stablecoins with readily convertible collateral, can be treated as fungible means of payment comparable to bank deposits. [SUERF] See also: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp3111~db48fc6139.en.pdf

#Fintech #Fungibility #CryptoAssets #Stablecoins #Regulation #DFC

·suerf.org·Apr 28, 2026

Are Stablecoins Fungible Money? (SUERF)

Reforming MiCA for Euro Stablecoins (Blockchain for Europe)

Blockchain for Europe published a report in which Ulrich Bindseil and Erwin Voloder propose reforms to the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) to bolster euro-denominated electronic money tokens (EMTs). Core recommendations include permitting remuneration limited to reserve income pass-through, eliminating the 30-60% minimum bank deposit requirement to enable diversified high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) akin to liquidity coverage ratio standards, enhancing proportionate reserve transparency via standardized reporting, mandating stress testing and concentration limits, granting calibrated central bank deposit access for safeguarding, and clarifying cross-border multi-issuance frameworks. These adjustments aim to mitigate MiCAR's regulatory overreach—placing Europe on the downward-sloping Laffer curve for stablecoin competitiveness—while preserving prudential safeguards, reducing bank interdependencies, and elevating the euro's global on-chain role amid U.S. dollar dominance. [Blockchain for Europe]

#CryptoAssets #Europe #Regulation #Stablecoins #Fintech #DFC

·blockchain4europe.eu·Apr 28, 2026

Reforming MiCA for Euro Stablecoins (Blockchain for Europe)

Can Europe Realistically Build a Third Global Scheme? (LinkedIn)

In February 2026, Martina Weimert of the European Payments Initiative highlighted the absence of pan‑European private infrastructure despite national schemes and promotes Wero as an emerging network, while the European Central Bank continued to advance the digital euro to bolster monetary and payments sovereignty. In terms of C2B card transactions, the overwhelming share runs on the rails of US-based VISA and MasterCard, and this does not include co-branded cards (see country-by-country graphic). For example, Cartes Bancaires (CB) is a very popular card scheme in France, but it is not found anywhere else in Europe. So, to function outside France, CB cards use the Visa and Mastercard rails. The real challenge for Europe will be interoperability, to unite the different payment habits and scheme that may exist in each individual country. [LinkedIn]

#Europe #Payments #Interoperability #MasterCard #VISA #Fintech #Eurozone #DFC

·linkedin.com·Apr 28, 2026

Can Europe Realistically Build a Third Global Scheme? (LinkedIn)

Tap a Card, Pay by Phone, but Cash Still Holds its Own (BIS CPMI)

The BIS Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) published a brief that argues that rapid growth in digital and fast payments coexists with a plateau, rather than collapse, in cash usage across major economies. Cashless transactions per capita continue to rise, led by credit transfers and fast payments in emerging markets and card use in advanced economies, while average ticket sizes fall as systems are used for smaller‑value retail payments. This supports policies enhancing fast payment infrastructure and maintaining resilient cash access, with implications for ATM/branch networks, financial inclusion, and the calibration of legal tender and cash services frameworks. Open questions remain around the causal impact of reduced access points on cash demand and how far digitalization will structurally displace cash holdings versus transactional use. (BIS CPMI)

#Cash #Payments #FastPayments #Fintech #BIS #DFC

·bis.org·Apr 28, 2026

Tap a Card, Pay by Phone, but Cash Still Holds its Own (BIS CPMI)

Western Union to Launch Stablecoin Next Month (The Block)

Western Union will launch a Solana-based, U.S. dollar–backed stablecoin called USDPT next month, initially using it as an internal settlement rail with key agents in select countries as an alternative to SWIFT, enabling on-chain cross-border settlement even during traditional banking holidays. The firm is also rolling out a Digital Asset Network (DAN) that connects consumer crypto wallets to Western Union’s retail and agent network so users can cash out digital assets into local currency through familiar outlets, with the first partner going live this week. Later this year, Western Union plans a USD “Stable Card” in dozens of markets, allowing consumers—especially in inflation-prone countries—to hold dollar-denominated value in stablecoins and spend globally. [The Block]

#Fintech #Payments #Remittances #Stablecoins #CrossBorder #CryptoAssets #DFC

·theblock.co·Apr 28, 2026

Western Union to Launch Stablecoin Next Month (The Block)

ECB Signs Agreements with European Standard Setters to Facilitate Digital Euro Payments (ECB)

The European Central Bank (ECB) announced agreements with three European payment standard‑setting bodies to reuse existing open standards for processing online digital euro payments. The standards include European Card Payment Cooperation (ECPC) CPACE (to support contactless “tap‑to‑pay” payments using near‑field communication between a payment device and a payment terminal); nexo (specifications to connect merchants’ systems with the back-end systems of payment service providers and acquirers; and Berlin Group (to allow payments to be made using an alias (such as a mobile phone number) and support balance checks and reconciliation across mobile devices and payment acceptance in areas like digital euro transactions initiated in merchant apps on smartphones). The deal aims to reduce integration costs, support cross‑border scaling of European schemes, and lessen dependence on proprietary card and wallet standards owned by global firms. This move embeds the project in existing retail payment infrastructure, but leaves open how additional standards and governance will evolve over time. [ECB]

#ECB #Eurozone #CBDC #Fintech #DFC

·ecb.europa.eu·Apr 27, 2026

ECB Signs Agreements with European Standard Setters to Facilitate Digital Euro Payments (ECB)

Bill Seeks to Expand Access to Federal Reserve Payment Systems (Hunton)

U.S. Reps. Young Kim (R-CA) and Sam Liccardo (D-CA) introduced the Payments Access and Consumer Efficiency (PACE) Act, a bipartisan bill that would allow qualified nonbank financial companies — including FinTechs and digital asset businesses — to directly access Federal Reserve payment rails, including Fedwire, FedNow, and FedACH. To qualify, a firm must hold either a state banking/credit union charter or at least 40 active state money transmitter licenses. Eligible companies could opt into OCC supervision in exchange for meeting bank-like standards on capital, liquidity, risk management, BSA/AML compliance, and consumer protection. Firms would also be required to maintain 1:1 reserves backing customer funds, keep those funds segregated from company assets, and prioritize consumer claims in insolvency. (Hunton)

#Fintech #PaymentSystems #Regulation #UnitedStates

·hunton.com·Apr 25, 2026

Bill Seeks to Expand Access to Federal Reserve Payment Systems (Hunton)