Central Bank Digital Currency: Central Banking for All? This St. Louis Fed paper, which has been kicking around in draft form for some time, discusses how the introduction of a central bank digital currency allows the central bank to engage in large-scale intermediation by competing with private financial intermediaries for deposits. In such a world, because a central bank is not an investment expert and cannot invest in long-term projects itself, it relies on commercial banks to do so. The paper derives an equivalence result that shows that absent a banking panic, the set of allocations achieved with private financial intermediation will also be achieved with a CBDC. During a panic, however, it shows that the rigidity of the central bank's contract with the investment banks has the capacity to deter runs. Thus, the central bank is more stable than the commercial banking sector. Depositors internalize this feature ex-ante, and the central bank arises as a deposit monopolist, attracting all deposits away from the commercial banking sector. This monopoly might endanger maturity transformation.