In an interview with the Financial Times (FT) the chair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Erik Thedéen, has called for a reworking of global crypto rules for banks after the US and UK refused to adopt requirements imposing a 1,250% risk weighting on stablecoins and other digital assets that used permissionless blockchains. Thedéen noted that the sharp rise in stablecoin usage and differing regulatory stances have made it difficult to achieve consensus, prompting calls for a new approach. While the current Basel rules, originally focused on assets like bitcoin, would subject many stablecoins to the harshest capital requirements, major regulators such as the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have decided not to implement them in full. [Source: FT]
Stablecoin Performance in Cross-Border The Stanford University Future of Digital Currency Initiative (FDCI) published a paper that examines the performance of dollar-based stablecoins in cross-border payments using a dataset of over 41 million transactions from Airtm, a digital dollar wallet platform, spanning May 2019 to May 2024. The analysis benchmarks transaction speed and cost against G20 Roadmap targets for enhancing cross-border payments. The findings indicate that stablecoins demonstrate substantial advantages in speed, with more than 96% of transactions settling within one hour, significantly exceeding the G20's 75% target. Cost performance is more variable: approximately 51% of transactions meet the 3% fee target for remittances and 36.7% meet the 1% target for retail payments, though fees remain elevated for certain transaction types, particularly peer-to-peer marketplace on- and off-ramps. The study also highlights that stablecoins enable previously uneconomical use cases, with nearly half of enterprise disbursements being micropayments under $2. [Stanford FDCI]
The IMF published a Fintech Note that examines whether central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) could enhance competition in retail payment markets. The authors analyze CBDC's potential competitive impact through four channels: pricing discipline, service quality improvements, market contestability, and financial access expansion. The analysis identifies three market scenarios with varying competitive implications. In unregulated markets dominated by private platforms, CBDC could exert substantial competitive pressure by reducing fees and lowering entry barriers, particularly if interoperability with existing systems is ensured. In markets already subject to regulatory interventions such as interchange fee caps, CBDC would likely have more moderate effects, addressing residual gaps rather than fundamentally altering market dynamics. In jurisdictions with well-functioning public fast payment systems, CBDC would offer primarily incremental benefits, mainly extending access to underserved populations. The Note emphasizes that CBDC's actual competitive impact depends critically on design choices—including fee structures, intermediary participation rules, holding limits, and interoperability requirements—and warns that overly aggressive pricing could crowd out private providers, potentially reducing payment system resilience and diversity. [Source: IMF]