Data Externalities, Market Power, and the Optimal CBDC Design (BoC)
The Bank of Canada (BoC) published a paper by Cheng, Davoodalhosseini, Chiu, and Jiang that shows that central bank digital currency (CBDC) economics is complicated by private payment service provider (PSP) transaction data harvesting and sale. A well-designed CBDC should collect some transaction data itself — for fraud detection and financial crime monitoring — but not sell it. Counterintuitively, a U.S.-calibrated model finds that introducing a CBDC would increase rather than reduce PSP data collection, because PSP market power currently dominates - i.e., public competition pushes PSPs to expand their customer base, raising aggregate data output. The reverse holds if PSP competition intensifies, in which case a CBDC designed to curb data monetization would shrink PSPs' market share and reduce aggregate data production. [BoC]
