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Is the Digital Euro a Solution in Search of a Problem? (Banque de France)
Is the Digital Euro a Solution in Search of a Problem? (Banque de France)

Second Deputy Governor of the Banque de France Agnès Bénassy-Quéré argues that the digital euro responds to Europe’s strategic dependence on Visa and Mastercard and rising card fees, not an abstract techno-fix. Bank cards dominate non-cash payments, yet many euro-area countries lack national schemes and rely entirely on US networks, giving them leverage over European users and pricing. Instant transfers exist but are under-used in retail due to weak commercial front-ends. Bénassy-Quéré argues that the digital euro, rolled out euro-area wide as legal tender, can break network effects, underpin a sovereign infrastructure, and complement private solutions like Wero and EuropA within unified wallets, improving resilience and autonomy. [Banque de France]

·banque-france.fr·
Is the Digital Euro a Solution in Search of a Problem? (Banque de France)
Assessing Whether Stablecoin Velocity Translates into Economic Impact (VISA)
Assessing Whether Stablecoin Velocity Translates into Economic Impact (VISA)

VISA's Ezechiel Copic argues that raw stablecoin velocity is a misleading proxy for “economic relevance” because it mostly reflects wholesale‑style financial activity rather than retail spending, so it must be benchmarked against Fedwire‑like turnover rather than M1. It explains that traditional M1 velocity measures how often money is used for purchases of goods and services, whereas total stablecoin velocity—calculated as on‑chain transaction volume divided by circulating supply—captures predominantly trading, settlement, and funding flows. When filtered to transactions of 250 dollars or less as a rough stand‑in for retail payments, stablecoin “retail” velocity is far below U.S. M1 velocity, implying minimal use in everyday commerce. But when compared to a financial‑system benchmark based on Fedwire transaction value relative to reserve balances, stablecoin velocity is still much lower in scale, indicating that while stablecoins show growing importance in financial markets, they remain modest relative to established wholesale infrastructures. Overall, the piece concludes that interpreting stablecoin data requires distinguishing retail from financial‑system use and recognizing that current stablecoin impact is concentrated in the latter. [VISA]

·corporate.visa.com·
Assessing Whether Stablecoin Velocity Translates into Economic Impact (VISA)
Tether Launches tether.wallet Self-Custodial Digital Wallet (Tether)
Tether Launches tether.wallet Self-Custodial Digital Wallet (Tether)
Tether has launched tether.wallet, a self‑custodial digital wallet intended to extend its stablecoin‑based payment infrastructure directly to end users in over 160 countries. The product aggregates access to Tether’s digital dollars (USD₮, USA₮), gold (XAU₮), and Bitcoin across multiple networks, abstracts away gas‑token management, and enables transfers via simple human‑readable identifiers, reducing frictions that have limited previous wallet adoption. This move potentially deepens dollarization dynamics in high‑inflation and underbanked jurisdictions while bypassing bank‑intermediated channels. [Tether]
·tether.io·
Tether Launches tether.wallet Self-Custodial Digital Wallet (Tether)
Factors that Promote Adoption and Use of a CBDC in Peru (IDEAS)
Factors that Promote Adoption and Use of a CBDC in Peru (IDEAS)
Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP) economists examined the determinants of adoption and usage of Peru's retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) pilot, implemented through Viettel's BiPay digital wallet beginning in October 2024, focusing on eight regions with low financial inclusion. Based on individual-level survey data, active CBDC usage was positively associated with awareness of the BCRP's role in the pilot, wallet satisfaction, knowledge of functionalities, and prior digital wallet use, while self-employment was negatively associated, plausibly due to the pilot's closed-loop, non-interoperable design. Targeted advertising significantly increased merchant adoption, active user counts, and bill payment volumes, with merchant network expansion identified as a key transmission channel. The authors conclude that retail CBDC scaling requires attention to both sides of the payment market — user-facing communication and financial incentives on the demand side, merchant onboarding on the supply side — with interoperability remaining a persistent structural barrier to broader adoption. [IDEAS]
·ideas.repec.org·
Factors that Promote Adoption and Use of a CBDC in Peru (IDEAS)
South Korean Government to Test Tokenized Deposits on Disbursements (MOEF)
South Korean Government to Test Tokenized Deposits on Disbursements (MOEF)
South Korea’s Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) will run a regulatory sandbox pilot in Sejong City to use distributed ledger technology (DLT) based tokenized bank deposits for day‑to‑day government operational spending, testing preset time, amount, and category controls on expenses to improve oversight and reduce misuse, with legal and regulatory changes and nationwide rollout targeted from Q4 2026 as part of a broader plan to digitize around a quarter of treasury disbursements by 2030, building on an earlier tokenized‑deposit subsidy pilot for EV charging infrastructure. https://cointelegraph.com/news/south-korea-pilot-tokenized-deposits-government-spending [MOEF]
·mofe.go.kr·
South Korean Government to Test Tokenized Deposits on Disbursements (MOEF)
Central Banks of UAE and Philippines Agree to Link Instant Payment Systems (CBUAE)
Central Banks of UAE and Philippines Agree to Link Instant Payment Systems (CBUAE)
The Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates (CBUAE) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to support broader cooperation on financial infrastructure and payments connectivity. This includes working to integrate their instant payment platforms to enable seamless cross-border payment transactions. The MoU also provides for collaboration on central bank digital currency (CBDC) initiatives, including sharing expertise on the development of CBDC platforms for individuals and institutions. [CBUAE]
·up.raindrop.io·
Central Banks of UAE and Philippines Agree to Link Instant Payment Systems (CBUAE)
Building Gulf stablecoins and CBDCs infrastructures (Edgar, Dunn & Company)
Building Gulf stablecoins and CBDCs infrastructures (Edgar, Dunn & Company)
Edgar, Dunn & Company published a survey of the development of stablecoins and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) across the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. It argues that strategic motivations — reducing dependence on dollar-denominated Western payment infrastructure, modernizing domestic financial systems, and reasserting monetary sovereignty — are driving a coordinated, regulation-first approach to digital currency development. The UAE and Bahrain are identified as the most advanced jurisdictions, with Saudi Arabia positioned as a rising participant focused primarily on wholesale CBDC applications via Project mBridge. Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman remain at earlier stages. The report characterizes the regional model as a two-tier architecture in which state authorities define the regulatory perimeter while private-sector institutions handle distribution and adoption. Several case studies — including the Digital Dirham, AE Coin, mBridge, and ADIB Smart Sukuk — are presented to illustrate current implementation status. [Edgar, Dunn & Company]
·edgardunn.com·
Building Gulf stablecoins and CBDCs infrastructures (Edgar, Dunn & Company)
Banks Can Process Stablecoins Like Cheques (LinkedIn)
Banks Can Process Stablecoins Like Cheques (LinkedIn)

Tony McLaughlin (Ubyx) and Mike Ringer (ReStabilize) argue that regulated financial institutions should be allowed to process stablecoins as collection agents under existing banking law, analogously to cheques. They propose that banks and fintechs receive customer stablecoins, present them for redemption, and credit fiat balances, without being reclassified as crypto-asset dealers. This functional approach would make hosted stablecoin wallets commercially viable within banks and enable reusable identity and compliance credentials for self-custody wallets, expanding the effective regulatory perimeter while preserving non-custodial usage. It could shift stablecoin activity from opaque channels into supervised institutions and position the United Kingdom’s financial infrastructure for future sterling stablecoins and tokenized deposits. The key unresolved question is how legislators and supervisors will define the legal boundary between simple collection activity and broader crypto intermediation. [LinkedIn]

·linkedin.com·
Banks Can Process Stablecoins Like Cheques (LinkedIn)
RBI Shelves Plan to Launch Digital Currency (Hindu Business Line)
RBI Shelves Plan to Launch Digital Currency (Hindu Business Line)
[January 1, 2019] The RBI reportedly quietly dropped its plan to issue a central bank digital currency (CBDC), despite having set up an inter‑departmental group to study it. Officials reportedly felt it was too early for such a move, and the feasibility report was never published, reflecting limited internal capacity on blockchain and digital currency policy. The proposed CBDC had been framed as a tool to address black money, money laundering, and cyber‑security risks, but industry voices argued that launching it would be premature and that India should watch smaller advanced jurisdictions like the UAE and Singapore first. [Hindu Business Line]
RBI shelves plan to launch digital currency
·web.archive.org·
RBI Shelves Plan to Launch Digital Currency (Hindu Business Line)
RBI Governor ays Its Too Early for CBDC (Business Standard)
RBI Governor ays Its Too Early for CBDC (Business Standard)
[December 5, 2019] Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor Shaktikanta Das reportedly said that it is too early to introduce a central bank digital currency (CBDC) because the necessary technology and safeguards are still at an incipient stage, though it has examined the idea internally and discussed it with other central banks and governments. He stressed that any such CBDC would only be considered seriously when technology matures and adequate safeguards are in place. He firmly distinguished this from private digital currencies, which he rejects on the grounds that currency issuance is a sovereign function and must remain with the state, noting that global central banks and governments broadly oppose private digital currencies for the same reason. [Business Standard]
·business-standard.com·
RBI Governor ays Its Too Early for CBDC (Business Standard)
Reserve Bank of India Updates Digital Rupee FAQ (RBI)
Reserve Bank of India Updates Digital Rupee FAQ (RBI)
[February 4, 2026] The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has issued updated FAQs explaining the design and objectives of India’s Digital Rupee (e₹) pilots in retail and wholesale segments. Retail e₹ is presented as legal-tender central bank digital currency equivalent to cash, distributed via banks and non-banks through mobile wallets, interoperable with existing QR infrastructure, and supporting offline and programmable features to enable cash-like use, targeted transfers, and constrained spending. Wholesale e₹ is framed as restricted-access central bank money for interbank and securities settlement, using programmability and smart contracts to reduce settlement risk and infrastructure costs in government securities, call money, and tokenized certificates of deposit. The document signals an incremental, pilot-based approach focused on testing technology, scalability, and institutional roles rather than rapid scale-up, leaving open questions about future onboarding models, governance of programmability, and long-run integration with systems like UPI. [RBI]
·web.archive.org·
Reserve Bank of India Updates Digital Rupee FAQ (RBI)
Making Stablecoins Stable (IMF)
Making Stablecoins Stable (IMF)
The IMF published a paper that develops a theoretical framework to analyze the tension between stablecoin stability and issuer incentives. The central finding is that unregulated stablecoin issuers hold excessive risky assets to maximize profits, thereby elevating run risk while failing to internalize the welfare consequences for households. A regulator acting in the broad public interest can improve upon this outcome by mandating high-quality liquid asset backing, ideally central bank reserves, but strict liquidity requirements alone reduce issuer profitability and suppress stablecoin supply below socially optimal levels. The authors argue that achieving both stability and adequate issuance requires two complementary policy instruments: a safe backing asset requirement and a supplementary revenue source for issuers, such as remuneration on reserves or regulated data monetization. The paper draws supporting parallels from China's e-money experience and situates its findings relative to emerging regulatory frameworks including the U.S. GENIUS Act and the EU's MiCA regulation. [IMF]
·imf.org·
Making Stablecoins Stable (IMF)
What Are Stablecoins Used for Today? Estimating the Distribution of Stablecoins (Kansas City Fed)
What Are Stablecoins Used for Today? Estimating the Distribution of Stablecoins (Kansas City Fed)
The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Kansas City Fed) published an article in which Franklin Noll estimates that stablecoins are used predominantly for crypto‑finance trading, with payments accounting for less than 1 percent of supply. He finds roughly half of outstanding stablecoins sit in exchanges, decentralized finance, and related infrastructure, with another large share used for high‑value transfers and a material portion idle in rarely used wallets. This usage pattern implies that stablecoins currently function more as market plumbing and speculative liquidity than as a broad retail or commercial payments instrument, and that reliance on bridges and exchanges highlights interoperability and concentration risks in the ecosystem. [Kansas City Fed]
·kansascityfed.org·
What Are Stablecoins Used for Today? Estimating the Distribution of Stablecoins (Kansas City Fed)
Money and Payments Infrastructure: Understanding the Plumbing (Central Bank of Ireland)
Money and Payments Infrastructure: Understanding the Plumbing (Central Bank of Ireland)
The Central Bank of Ireland published an article in which Rhys Bidder argues that debates on stablecoins and blockchain-based money require a common analytical framework linking them to existing two-tier monetary structures and settlement systems. The article first defines money, settlement assets, and the distinction between public and private money, then maps how European payment “plumbing” centers on TARGET, related real-time gross settlement services, and collateral frameworks. It shows how commercial bank deposits, card networks, and correspondent banking ultimately settle in central bank reserves, while stablecoins function as bearer instruments whose secondary-market transfers bypass real-time gross settlement in central bank money. This matters for how regulators think about singleness of money, settlement finality, liquidity backstops, and access of non‑banks to core infrastructure, and for how tokenized deposits or central bank distributed ledger technology might modernize the two-tier model. The key open question is how far to integrate or constrain blockchain-based payment rails within this architecture. [Central Bank of Ireland]
·centralbank.ie·
Money and Payments Infrastructure: Understanding the Plumbing (Central Bank of Ireland)
Stablecoin Issuance Market: Four Business Models Reshaping the Market (Tiger Research)
Stablecoin Issuance Market: Four Business Models Reshaping the Market (Tiger Research)
Tiger Research published a report arguing that late‑entry stablecoin issuers can survive only by abandoning the dominant reserve‑interest model and specializing in distinct market niches. The authors show that Tether uses scale to monetize reserves while gradually repairing transparency and building a diversified real‑world asset (RWA) and investment portfolio, turning regulatory normalization into a way to defend its monetary base. StraitsX instead treats stablecoins as payments infrastructure, monetizing fee‑based transaction velocity under a Monetary Authority of Singapore license that converts compliance into a regional moat. M0 repositions issuance as shared infrastructure, using network effects across issuers and builders to become a neutral standard rather than a competing coin. KRWQ treats regulatory gaps and offshore non‑deliverable forward demand as an entry point, using offshore liquidity as an option on future domestic legitimacy, leaving open whether such sequencing can withstand eventual onshore regulatory choices. [Tiger Research]
·reports.tiger-research.com·
Stablecoin Issuance Market: Four Business Models Reshaping the Market (Tiger Research)
Self-Custodial Wallets in a Regulated World (Walletconnect and Ubyx)
Self-Custodial Wallets in a Regulated World (Walletconnect and Ubyx)
WalletConnect and Ubyx published a paper arguing that self-custodial wallets can operate within existing anti–money laundering, sanctions, and tax frameworks if regulators adopt technology-neutral, outcomes-based rules and focus obligations on intermediaries at the “edge.” The authors document concrete mechanisms—such as FATF "travel rule" data capture within wallet flows, cryptographic “sign-In with X” ownership proofs, programmable token-level controls, and blockchain analytics—that allow virtual asset service providers to meet customer due diligence, travel rule, and reporting obligations without banning or custodianizing self-custody. This matters because exclusionary rules would push activity offshore, create a two-tier system, and undermine both financial inclusion and supervisory visibility, whereas regulated interoperability preserves open finance benefits while strengthening compliance. The paper highlights unresolved questions around the precise regulatory status of new wallet architectures (trusted execution environments, multi-party computation, bank-deployed wallets) and the scope and consistency of edge-enforcement obligations across jurisdictions. [Walletconnect and Ubyx]
·share.hsforms.com·
Self-Custodial Wallets in a Regulated World (Walletconnect and Ubyx)
Banco Central de Bolivia to Explore Wholesale CBDC in 2026 (BCB)
Banco Central de Bolivia to Explore Wholesale CBDC in 2026 (BCB)
[November 6, 2025] Banco Central de Bolivia (BCB) issued a press release outlining a phased roadmap to explore a wholesale central bank digital currency (CBDC) dubbed the Boliviano Digital through 2026. The plan sequences stakeholder consultations, surveys of potential participants, further technical and regulatory evaluation, and prototype testing in controlled environments to minimize operational and technological risk while building institutional capacity. For policy and market structure, the initiative positions CBDC as an infrastructure upgrade for interbank payments, cost reduction, and innovation. https://web.archive.org/web/20260119213347/https://www.bcb.gob.bo/webdocs/10_notas_prensa/CP%2054%20Ruta%20cr%C3%ADtica%20Boliviano%20Digital_OK.pdf [BCB]
·bcb.gob.bo·
Banco Central de Bolivia to Explore Wholesale CBDC in 2026 (BCB)
Tokenization Frameworks: Designs for a New Era (OMFIF)
Tokenization Frameworks: Designs for a New Era (OMFIF)
OMFIF, in partnership with Luxembourg for Finance, argues that the core tokenization policy choice is how to structure legal and market foundations so tokenization’s efficiency gains do not amplify legal and liquidity risks. It distinguishes direct, indirect, and incomplete tokenisation, stressing that only direct structures mainly alter operations, while wrappers and synthetic forms import securitization-style and counterparty risks and can weaken investor protections if entitlements are opaque. And while faster, potentially atomic settlement can cut counterparty and capital charges, fully instant settlement may be undesirable for many investors and instead atomic settlement on demand plus documentation automation may produce the more efficient equilibrium. It notes that tokenized collateral and money market fund units can materially improve intraday liquidity and collateral reuse, but also introduce new run and liquidity-mismatch dynamics and place greater weight on how custodians, depositories, and central securities depositories adapt rather than disappear. [OMFIF]
·omfif.org·
Tokenization Frameworks: Designs for a New Era (OMFIF)
Payment Stablecoins and Cross Border Payments: Benefits and Implications for Monetary Policy Implementation (FRB)
Payment Stablecoins and Cross Border Payments: Benefits and Implications for Monetary Policy Implementation (FRB)
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) staff outline how regulated “payment stablecoins” for cross‑border use could lower reliance on correspondent banking while altering demand for reserves, deposits, and Treasury bills. They argue that low‑cost, widely accessible stablecoins could shorten payment chains, compress fees and delays, and introduce competitive pressure on concentrated correspondent banking networks, but would still leave some reliance on large banks for foreign exchange risk‑management and on/off‑ramp services. For policy and institutional design, they stress that stablecoin reserve‑asset composition—bank deposits, Treasury bills, or central bank reserves—would shift liquidity, safe‑asset demand, and central bank balance‑sheet management in materially different ways. [FRB]
·federalreserve.gov·
Payment Stablecoins and Cross Border Payments: Benefits and Implications for Monetary Policy Implementation (FRB)
Is Nigeria’s eNaira Dead? (Cryptonews)
Is Nigeria’s eNaira Dead? (Cryptonews)
[October 22, 2025] Nigeria’s eNaira has effectively slipped into a quiet death, with official channels and infrastructure fading away even as authorities stop short of formally killing the project. The mobile apps have disappeared from major app stores, the USSD access channel no longer works, and the official social media presence has gone silent, leaving users locked out or unable to complete basic actions. And the eNaira's official website (https://www.enaira.gov.ng) returns a "404 Web Site not found" message. [Cryptonews]
·cryptonews.com·
Is Nigeria’s eNaira Dead? (Cryptonews)
Do We Really Need the Digital Euro: A Solution to What Problem Exactly? (IEA)
Do We Really Need the Digital Euro: A Solution to What Problem Exactly? (IEA)
[April 30, 2025] The Instituto Espanol de Analysts (IEA) published a book that included a chapter by European Parliament rapporteur Fernando Navarette, that argues that a digital euro is a mis-specified response to Europe’s payments challenges and should be downgraded to a contingency “Plan B.” He contends that the core problems—trust in money post‑crisis, overreliance on non‑EU payment schemes, and stablecoin‑driven currency substitution—are better addressed through institutional and regulatory reforms, wholesale central bank digital currency (CBDC), and pan‑European instant‑payment solutions based on commercial bank money. Navarrete stresses that retail CBDC is inherently destabilizing for bank funding, raises unresolved privacy and governance risks, and risks crowding out private innovation, especially if coupled with legal tender and complex “waterfall” mechanics. He instead proposes a three‑pillar architecture: private‑led interoperable instant payments, a narrowly scoped offline digital euro, and wholesale CBDC—leaving a full retail CBDC only as a last‑resort backup if private efforts fail. [IEA]
·institutodeanalistas.com·
Do We Really Need the Digital Euro: A Solution to What Problem Exactly? (IEA)
Legal and Regulatory Considerations for Digital Assets (CCAF)
Legal and Regulatory Considerations for Digital Assets (CCAF)
The Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (CCAF) published a report that argues that most digital assets map onto existing legal concepts and that regulation should therefore hinge on underlying rights and functions rather than token form or technology stack. The authors distinguish digital assets that merely represent traditional financial or non‑financial claims from “crypto-assets,” defined as issuer‑less units native to open distributed ledger technology (DLT) systems that perform essential incentive functions and do not themselves embody rights against an issuer. This reframing pushes regulatory perimeter design toward claim‑based and function‑based taxonomies, clarifies when tokenization is simply a new representation of existing instruments, and highlights that property‑law adjustments to accommodate natively digital assets are critical for legal certainty and market development. The central open issue is whether and how different legal traditions will adapt their property and collateral frameworks to accommodate these crypto-assets on a durable basis. (CCAF)
·papers.ssrn.com·
Legal and Regulatory Considerations for Digital Assets (CCAF)
The eNaira Journey So Far (CBN)
The eNaira Journey So Far (CBN)
[In 2023] the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) published a book on the economics of digital currencies in which there was a review of how the eNaira central bank digital currency (CBDC) was designed, launched, and managed. It argues that weak demand reflects structural and institutional frictions rather than purely technological failure. The review documents a phased rollout focused on financial inclusion, payment efficiency, and monetary control, but shows that limited interoperability, burdensome onboarding, and unclear value propositions constrained uptake. It emphasizes how institutional choices around wallet tiers, distribution architecture, and bank–fintech roles reshaped market incentives, often reinforcing banks’ dominance rather than fostering broader innovation. It highlights the need to recalibrate design toward open interfaces, clearer legal and regulatory frameworks, and better alignment between central bank objectives and private‑sector business models. [CBN]
·cbn.gov.ng·
The eNaira Journey So Far (CBN)
An Efficient Frontier Analysis of Stablecoin Reserve Management (VISA)
An Efficient Frontier Analysis of Stablecoin Reserve Management (VISA)
VISA published an article in which Ezechiel Copic uses an efficient frontier framework to show how new U.S. and EU stablecoin rules compress reserve returns and reorient issuer economics toward liquidity and resilience. The article models pre‑regulation reserve strategies using Tether’s historical mix to illustrate a wide opportunity set, then re‑estimates frontiers under the U.S. GENIUS Act and the EU’s Markets in Crypto‑Assets Regulation. Under GENIUS, a narrow set of high‑quality liquid assets leaves only a thin band of feasible risk‑return combinations, making reserve management resemble liquidity engineering rather than portfolio optimization. Under MiCA, lower euro‑area rates and binding bank‑deposit floors further depress and compress the frontier, especially for “significant” issuers. The analysis implies competition will shift from balance‑sheet yield to technology, distribution, and compliance, while leaving open how far reduced issuer economics may constrain market entry and long‑run innovation. [VISA]
·corporate.visa.com·
An Efficient Frontier Analysis of Stablecoin Reserve Management (VISA)
Tokenized Finance (IMF)
Tokenized Finance (IMF)
The IMF's Tobias Adrian argues that tokenization is a structural reconfiguration of financial architecture that shifts trust and risk management from institutions to programmable infrastructures. Tokenization enables atomic, real-time settlement and embedded compliance across money, banking, capital markets, and financial market infrastructures, compressing value chains but also accelerating liquidity dynamics and potential stress transmission. For emerging and developing economies, although tokenization may lower payment and market-access frictions, it heightens risks of volatile capital flows, currency substitution, and fragmented liquidity. The note emphasizes that the long-term success of tokenization depends on anchoring digital finance in public trust through clear policy frameworks and safe settlement assets, robust governance of code, legal certainty, and international coordination. Absent such anchors, tokenization risks amplifying financial instability through speed, concentration, and fragmentation, as contract-based risk management alter the nature of settlement, liquidity, and systemic risk. [IMF]
·imf.org·
Tokenized Finance (IMF)
Next steps and Considerations for Kazakhstan's Digital Tenge (IMF)
Next steps and Considerations for Kazakhstan's Digital Tenge (IMF)
[June 2024 but published in January 2026] The IMF published its findings regarding the plans of the National Bank of Kazakhstan and National Bank and National Payments Corporation to launch a central bank digital currency (CBDC) by end‑2025, emphasizing alignment of pilots with clear policy objectives and realistic technical capacity. It highlighted the need for an explicit legal basis beyond “banknotes and coins,” prioritization of use cases, tailored evaluation frameworks, and careful analysis of macro‑financial risks from broader applications such as crypto‑asset linkages and government or large‑value payments, alongside stress‑testing, minimum cyber‑resilience standards, and stronger internal and cross‑authority coordination. [IMF]
·imf.org·
Next steps and Considerations for Kazakhstan's Digital Tenge (IMF)
Fiat-Backed Stablecoins and Narrow Banking (Atlanta Fed)
Fiat-Backed Stablecoins and Narrow Banking (Atlanta Fed)
The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s published a paper that argues that fiat‑backed stablecoins effectively implement a modern variant of narrow, full‑reserve banking under the 2025 GENIUS Act. The note explains that Chicago‑plan narrow banks and fiat‑backed stablecoin issuers both fund only cash and Treasury bills, provide payments and safekeeping but not lending, and target 1:1 redeemability. It stresses that stablecoins embed extra operational and intermediation layers—wallets, exchanges, blockchain settlement, and dependence on fractional‑reserve banks as custodians—creating additional run, peg‑deviation, and settlement risks relative to narrow banks. For policy and regulatory design, the analysis frames GENIUS‑style stablecoin regimes as functionally similar to narrow banks but with weaker direct supervision, no deposit insurance, and higher contagion channels from the legacy banking system, leaving open how to price, regulate, and backstop these new liabilities over time. [Atlanta Fed]
·media.licdn.com·
Fiat-Backed Stablecoins and Narrow Banking (Atlanta Fed)
Information Structures in Stablecoin Markets (arXiv)
Information Structures in Stablecoin Markets (arXiv)
Columbia University's Brian Z. Zhu develops a global-game model in which stablecoin run risk depends jointly on reserve fundamentals, the behavior of a large seller, and the precision of public versus private information about reserves. The model decomposes total run probability into “collateral risk” (runs driven by weak assets) and “large sale risk” (runs triggered by sizable redemptions), and shows that a large holder unambiguously raises selling pressure and shifts risk weight toward large-sale-driven runs as its size grows. Higher-precision public information reduces runs when fundamentals are strong but can amplify runs when fundamentals are weak, while more precise private signals have the opposite comparative statics, implying that heterogeneous, noisy private beliefs can stabilize fundamentally sound but informationally opaque stablecoins. The paper maps these results to recent events and regulations, arguing that transparency mandates like the U.S. GENIUS Act strengthen the link between runs and fundamentals but may lower capital efficiency and reduce the stabilizing role of belief heterogeneity. [arXiv]
·arxiv.org·
Information Structures in Stablecoin Markets (arXiv)
Faster Settlement May Make For Poorer Markets (Coin Telegraph)
Faster Settlement May Make For Poorer Markets (Coin Telegraph)
Cointelegraph published an article in which Axis CEO Chris Kim argues that pushing settlement from T+1 toward real-time atomic settlement can degrade market quality by eroding netting and capital efficiency. Shorter settlement horizons reduce counterparty and timing risk but require full pre-funding of each trade, constraining leverage and increasing costs for high‑turnover strategies. This dynamic reinforces the centrality of large intermediaries that can coordinate liquidity at scale, reshaping market structure around new “liquidity gatekeepers” and critical coordination infrastructure. Key open questions concern how far policy and design can recover netting benefits in an on-chain, T+0 environment without re-importing systemic risk. [Coin Telegraph]
·cointelegraph.com·
Faster Settlement May Make For Poorer Markets (Coin Telegraph)
The Eurosystem’s Comprehensive Payments Strategy (ECB)
The Eurosystem’s Comprehensive Payments Strategy (ECB)
The European Central Bank (ECB) set out the Eurosystem’s comprehensive two pronged payments strategy, defining its vision for the evolution of European payments under rapid technological change. The first prong is upgrading core infrastructures such as T2, the real time gross settlement backbone for high value and time critical payments during business days, and TIPS, the 24/7 Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) instant retail settlement layer, while developing distributed ledger technology based wholesale settlement via Pontes and Appia. The second prong is a retail digital euro, with tokenized deposits and regulated, EU governed stablecoins in a complementary role. The strategy links tokenization choices to preserving the singleness of money, monetary sovereignty, and financial stability, reduces dependence on non European schemes, and embeds strategic autonomy and cyber resilience into core infrastructures and retail acceptance layers. It also promotes deeper integration of cross border and corporate payments through instant payments, standardization, and interlinking fast payment systems. [ECB]
·ecb.europa.eu·
The Eurosystem’s Comprehensive Payments Strategy (ECB)